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INTRODUCTION
On April 19, 1995, someone blew up the Murrah Federal Build-
ing in Oklahoma City, causing the largest loss of life from a terrorist
attack on American soil in history. Authorities believe that one of the
perpetrators of the attack is Timothy McVeigh, an ex-soldier who al-
legedly holds extreme right-wing views and a passionate hatred of the
t Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I would like to
thank Sanford Levinson and Glenn Harlan Reynolds for insightful comments, Susan Wil-
liams for peerless editing, and Wendy Schoener for enormously helpful research
assistance.
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Federal Government.1 Many commentators have speculated that Mc-
Veigh destroyed the building as revenge against the federal govern-
ment, particularly the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, for
the assault on the Branch Davidian compound at Waco, Texas, on
April 19, 1993.2 If these allegations are true, McVeigh's anger, while
extreme, is not the ire of an isolated lunatic. A nationwide social pro-
test movement-the so-called militia or "patriot" movement-has de-
veloped to combat what its members believe is a conspiracy by the
federal government to disarm the American citizenry.3 The goal of
this alleged conspiracy is to allow Jews, Blacks, the United Nations,
Russia, international bankers, or socialists (there is disagreement over
exactly who is behind the conspiracy) to assume control of the coun-
try.4 The disaster at Waco, the Brady Bill, and the ban on assault
weapons are thus all part of a single plot, the tip of the conspiratorial
iceberg.
McVeigh's affinity for militia ideas has thrust the militia move-
ment into the national spotlight for the first time, and the audience
has reacted with horror at the paranoia, racism, and violence that is
characteristic of some of the movement's members.5 Yet the most ar-
ticulate militia leaders deny being deranged hatemongers; rather,
they claim to be the modem defenders of the U.S. Constitution in
general and the Second Amendment in particular. In their minds,
they are merely protecting and exercising the right of the people to
make a revolution against a tyrannical government. Although the
claims have met scorn and derision, militia detractors have usually re-
jected these ideas before examining them with any care.
This Article will seriously examine the militia movement's inter-
pretation of the Second Amendment. It will evaluate where this inter-
pretation is on solid ground and where it crosses into treacherous
terrain. It will also consider the lessons that the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing can teach about the viability of a constitutional right to revolution
in a diverse twentieth-century democracy.
Some commentators might argue that the ideas of a fringe group
do not warrant serious analysis. I disagree for several reasons. First, as
evidenced by the Oklahoma City tragedy, militia groups have the ca-
1 See Evan Thomas et al., The Manhunt: Cleverness and Luck, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1995,
at 30.
2 See, e.g., Elizabeth Gleick, "Something Big is Going to Happen, "TME, May 8, 1995, at
50, 53; Russell Watson et al., Three Strange Friends, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1995, at 32; Gordon
Witkin, Attacking the Firearm Police; U.S. NEWS & WORmD REPORT, May 8, 1995, at 40.
3 See, e.g., Joseph P. Shapiro et al., An Epidemic of Fear and Loathing, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REPORT, May 8, 1995, at 37; Jill Smolowe, Enemies of the State, TME, May 8, 1995, at
58.
4 See, e.g., Shapiro et al., supra note 3, at 38; Smolowe, supra note 3, at 62-63.
5 For example, 80% of Americans would describe militia members as "dangerous,"
63% as "a threat to our way of life," and 55% as "crazy." Smolowe, supra note 3, at 60.
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pacity for violence, and so for practical reasons it is important to un-
derstand their animating ideology. Second, their constitutional
claims are not as far-fetched as they might first appear. Indeed, militia
ideologists share some of their beliefs with more mainstream theorists,
not only the National Rifle Association but also one school of thought
on the Second Amendment within the legal academy. Third, the mili-
tia's historical interpretation of the Second Amendment, while plainly
wrong on some points, is correct on others. Accordingly, careful at-
tention to militia doctrine may cast light on mainstream Second
Amendment theory, the modem significance of the historical back-
ground of the Amendment, and most importantly the continuing rele-
vance vel non of a right to revolution.
Part I of this Article analyzes the ways in which the militias' inter-
pretation of the Second Amendment faithfully reflects the thinking of
the Framers. In particular, the Framers would endorse several themes
that form the core of today's militia thinking. First, the people should
always fear the federal government; despite its electoral accountabil-
ity, it could always become corrupt, pursuing its own interests rather
than those of the people. Second, to counteract the threat of a cor-
rupt and tyrannical central government, the people should be armed
to overawe the government or, in extremis, to stage a revolution.
Third, for the people to be able to make a revolution, they must be
organized into militias. Finally, when government wishes to oppress
the people, it begins by disarming them, so they cannot resist. Militia
groups would add that the federal government has already become
corrupt and tyrannical and the time for revolution is fast approaching.
Hopefully they are wrong, but if so, they have simply made a factual
mistake. Their Second Amendment theory is not for that reason, in
and of itself, wrong.
To examine how it is in error, Part II will look more closely at the
conceptual universe of the framers of the amendment, particularly
the meaning of "the Body of the People." Steeped in the tradition of
civic republicanism, the proponents of the Second Amendment be-
lieved that the government and the citizenry should dedicate them-
selves to the Common Good: a good common to all, shared by all. Of
necessity, for a Common Good to exist, however, the citizenry must be
sufficiently homogeneous to share common interests. In that sense,
the citizenry is not a collection of independent individuals but an or-
ganic and unified entity. The constitutional right to arms belongs to
this body of the people, organized into a universal militia, so that it
can resist a corrupt federal government. Violence used by the govern-
ment for its own selfish ends is tyranny. Violence used by a faction of
the people for its own selfish ends is illegitimate rebellion. Violence
19961
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used by the Body of the People for the Common Good, however, is
legitimate revolution.
Many modem Americans fear the idea of a right of revolution
because it embodies the potential for anarchy and civil war. These
fears become irrelevant if, but only if, one presupposes the existence
of a Common Good and a Body of the People: if the people really are
homogeneous and unified, they will rise up as a single, organic collec-
tive and quickly restore legitimate government. This people must ex-
ist as an entity independent of government, because it must be able to
revolt against government and, for however briefly, to take the place
of government. Therefore, to make their interpretation of the Sec-
ond Amendment plausible, the militia groups must answer the follow-
ing questions: Is there in the late twentieth century a body of the
people? If so, who is in it?
The principal militia response to those questions is to conjure
with the People: militia writers assume that a people exists, that it is
angry with the government, and that it will soon take up arms to assert
its rights. While many scholars envision an America of interest groups
and fractious individuals, militia groups magically conjure an image of
an organic America with a citizenry so united that even in time of
revolution, it will act as one entity. Militia writers, however, are not
alone in this tendency. Many legal scholars who argue that the
Amendment guarantees an individual right to revolt write as if the
public were presently a unified entity called "the people." For these
scholars, the People seem to be an element of cosmology taken on
faith, a necessary piece of their analytical structure. This Article ar-
gues, by contrast, that the American people are not so united. Ac-
cordingly, a Second Amendment revolution may not be possible for
today, and so we may need a reinterpretation of the Amendment.
This suggestion may be wrong; it may be that as a citizenry we have
unities that I do not see. But any modern Second Amendment theory
must demonstrate those unities in order to demonstrate the modern
viability of the historical amendment. It is insufficient just to conjure
with the People.
Some militia ideologists seem to be aware that Americans as a
group are too diverse to launch a revolution today. As a result, these
writers offer more precise definitions of the People. These definitions
differ across various groups, but all share two features. First, they all
suffer from severe analytical and empirical problems. Taken together,
those problems suggest that a body of the people does not exist any-
more; and if it does not exist, neither can a right of revolution. Sec-
ond, all of the definitions exist against the backdrop of a grand
conspiracy that has captured the federal government, against whom
the People are defined. In other words, the People have their unity in
[Vol. 81:879882
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opposition to the hypothesized "Other" (Jews, Blacks, bankers, etc.)
that seeks to oppress the People. In this sense, the militia's paranoia
is necessary, not incidental, to its Second Amendment theory: a
revolution is possible only if a People exists, but for the militia, a peo-
ple exists only in being united to resist the federal conspiracy.
For heuristic purposes, this Article divides militia thinking about
conspiracies into four general themes, even though most militia
groups and members hold a combination of these beliefs. First, there
are the overt racists.6 These groups maintain that all constitutional
amendments after the Bill of Rights are invalid, so that the true Amer-
ican people is limited to white Christians who share a particular con-
servative heritage. These militia groups are prepared to stage a
revolution to defend that heritage against what they see as the assault
of auslanders in the federal government. These groups also have a
fair claim to be the direct ideological heirs of some of the American
revolutionaries, who also generally excluded non-whites7 and some-
times non-Christians.8 The problem with this definition is that it is
both malignantly exclusionary and implausible as a matter of contem-
porary constitutional law. And yet, if no one is excluded from the
citizenry, the central problem with a right of revolution emerges: can
all of these diverse persons with their diverse values and views share a
common good? Can they constitute a people? This Article calls this
difficulty the Demographic Problem in constituting a people.
Second, there are the anti-internationalists. 9 These writers be-
lieve that a foreign cabal led by the United Nations but including Rus-
sia, Israel, the Trilateral Commission, and third world countries, has
taken over the federal government to subjugate the American people.
Anti-internationalists offer elaborate outlines of the alleged conspir-
acy and see signs of it all around them. They believe that Americans
who do not share their belief in a conspiracy are deluded. As a result,
they claim to be acting in the interests of all Americans except the
traitorous few in league with the foreign enemy. The problem with
this view is that it seems out of touch with empirical reality. In a sense,
however, the anti-internationalists are acting consistently with the
spirit of the Second Amendment: the People are supposed to be ever
suspicious of the federal government; the People alone may judge
when the government has become corrupt, and sometimes only a
small vanguard remains awake to the danger, while the masses fall
6 See infra part I1IA
7 See Sylvia R. Frey, Liberty, Equality, and Slavery: The Paradox of the American Revolution,
in THE AMERaCAN REVOLUTION: ITs CHARAcrER AND LIMITS 230, 230-32 (Jack P. Greene ed.,
1987).
8 See GORDON S. WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERCAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 427-
28 (1969).
9 See infra part HI.B.
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asleep. Cast thus, the militias' argument causes the central problem
to emerge again: is it plausible that the American citizenry, in all its
magnificent diversity, deplorable ignorance, and distance from the
seat of power, will ever perceive empirical reality in the same way?
Will they ever agree if or when the federal government has become so
corrupt that revolution is the only answer? This Article calls this diffi-
culty the Epistemological Problem in constituting a people.
Third, there are the anti-socialists. 10 This group believes that a
cadre of socialists, led by President Clinton and Sarah Brady, has cap-
tured the federal government and intends to destroy the liberties of
American citizens. In particular, these writers believe that the income
tax, land use regulation, and, above all, gun control violate the Consti-
tution. The Brady Bill and the ban on assault weapons are only the
first stages in a plot by the "Clintonistas" to disarm the public so that
they can then dig up the Constitution root and branch. This group
believes that the American people are committed to the Constitution
(as the militia interprets it), or at least only those who are committed
to the Constitution (as the militia interprets it) are part of the Ameri-
can people, because loyalty to the Constitution is the principal compo-
nent of American peoplehood. Therefore, the argument goes,
President Clinton and the other socialists in Washington are enemies
of the American citizenry.
The views of this group suffer from two serious difficulties. The
first is the Interpretive Problem: even if the Constitution constitutes
us as a people, there has been no consensus on the meaning of that
document for a long time, if ever. If this criticism is sound, how can
there be a revolution made by and for the people as a body when
there is no agreement on the text that creates the People as a body?
The second difficulty is the Political Problem: anti-socialists are ex-
treme individualists; they resent any intrusion on their absolute free-
dom of action. But how can citizens become a people if they are
independent individuals with nothing in common but abstract free-
dom? To put the point another way: these groups feel contempt for
politics, but only by coming together in political space may citizens
constitute themselves a people. The anti-socialists' view of politics
therefore virtually precludes the possibility of Second Amendment
revolution. Such a revolution would be possible only if, by happen-
stance, millions of different people living under different circum-
stances with different values, beliefs, and perceptions, were suddenly
seized by the same spirit of resistance at the same moment. This polit-
ical problem is not a difficulty only for militias: millions of Americans
10 See infra part III.C.
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share their contempt for politics and thus would have difficulty find-
ing political space for a people.
Finally, there are the anti-secular humanists." These groups be-
lieve that the government's conspiracy has targeted conservative
Christianity, which is the inspiration and fundament of the Constitu-
tion. This group summarizes most of the problems detailed above.
Constituting a people around conservative Christianity poses demo-
graphic problems (not all American citizens are conservative Chris-
tians), epistemological problems (in the minds of many, there is no
conscious conspiracy to de-Christianize America), and interpretive
problems (by most official accounts, the Constitution does not privi-
lege conservative Christianity).
Any theory of Second Amendment revolution, therefore, must
squarely face the demographic, epistemological, interpretive, and
political problems outlined above. In the conclusion, this Article sug-
gests that these problems render "peoplehood" impossible in modern
America and, as a consequence, revolution may no longer be a viable
option for us. In a sense, the Second Amendment is a fragment of a
language that we no longer speak: it depends on the notion of a civic
republican People, but we have become too liberal and individualistic
to support such a concept. As American beliefs, demographics, and
epistemology change, certain forms of sociopolitical organization
close as options. A Second Amendment revolution is one that has
closed; it is a part of the American heritage that can have no more
lived meaning. Armed resistance today would be a civil war, not a
revolution. In my view, it is time to accept that fact; it is time to stop
conjuring with the idea of an organic American people, because that
idea leads us in the direction of the militias' thinking-to the creation
of an alien Other against whom we could all be united.
As some options close, however, others open. The revolution-
aries of 1776 went to war partly because they were not represented in
Parliament. As soon as the American Revolution was complete, how-
ever, the idea of revolution became less savory, because the people
had representation. If modern citizens sensibly fear an oppressive
government and if-there cannot be a true revolution, there are only
two options. Citizens may seek to foment factional rebellion, as do
the militias, or they may pour the same energies into politics and civil
society. Even if citizens cannot thereby create a People, they may
build a public life that is healthy, sane, and rational so that no one
feels the need to invent treasonous Others who deserve to die.
11 See infra part IH.D.
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I
WHAT THE MILITIA HAS RIGHT-ARMED REVOLUTION
The Militia of Montana (MOM) markets a T-shirt bearing an im-
age of an eighteenth-century militia member and the legend: "The
Second Amendment isn't about hunting or target shooting... It's
about FREEDOM!" 12 Although simplistic, the slogan captures the es-
sence of the historical Second Amendment; it guaranteed that armed
citizens could stage a revolution against a corrupt government.' 3 In-
deed, the militia's theory of the Amendment is better supported by
the historical record than the more popular view that characterizes
the Amendment primarily as a right of self-defense.
The militias themselves insist that they alone have faithfully re-
flected the Framers' views, as the nation around them has fallen away.
This self-conceptualization is pervasive and manifest in their writings.
Militia materials, for example, rely extensively on quotes from early
patriots about the meaning of the Second Amendment.' 4 M. Samuel
Sherwood, an influential militia organizer, dedicates his book, The
Guarantee of the Second Amendment, to Samuel Adams, John Hancock,
George Washington, George Mason, and Nathanael Greene, because
they created colonial militias to resist British tyranny.' 5 The Militia of
Montana and Linda Thompson, self-appointed Acting-Adjutant Gen-
eral of the Unorganized Militia of the USA, both issued declarations
of independence from the Federal Government, modelled on Jeffer-
12 Militia of Montana, Militia of Montana Catalogue, Nov. 21, 1994, at 11 (Noxon, Mon-
tana) (on file with the author).
13 In arguing that the amendment guarantees the right to make a revolution, I mean
more precisely that the amendment guarantees to citizens the right to own arms, so as to
be ready to make a revolution. The amendment therefore overtly protects only the right to
own arms, but it implicitly acknowledges the legitimacy of such a revolution: the point in
the amendment, after all, is to make revolution possible. The right actually to conduct a
revolution, however, might arise from natural law, rather than the constitution, simply be-
cause during many revolutions, the constitution by definition may have been suspended. I
will consider the complexities of this problem in a forthcoming paper. See David C. Wil-
liams, The Constitutional Right to "Conservative" Revolution (Sept. 1, 1996) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with the author). For present purposes, however, I wish only to be clear
about my meaning- when I refer to the constitutional right to revolution, I mean more
particularly (1) the constitutional right to own arms to make a revolution and (2) the
implicit constitutional acknowledgment of the legitimacy of revolution against a tyrannical
government.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 55, 62-70; see alsoJohn Grady, The Right to Bear
Arms, MILITIA NEWS, Collector's Edition 1994, at 5 (quoting Thomas Jefferson and Patrick
Henry), reprinted in KNN 'rH STERN, THE AMERICANJEWISH COMMITrEE, MILITIAS: A GROw-
INC DANGER, Vol. 5, Pub. No. 1, app. 104 (1995); Bernadine Smith, Interpreting the Meaning
and Purpose of the Second Amendment (Second Amendment Committee, Hanford, CA.)
(widely distributed at militia meetings) (on file with the author); Second Amendment Militia
Application (Second Amendment Committee, Hanford, CA.) [hereinafter Application] (on
file with the author).
15 See M. SAMUEL SHERWOOD, THE GUARANTEE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, at dedica-
tion page (1994) (self-published photocopied book, on file with the author).
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son's declaration. 16 MOM's version makes the analogy to the Fram-
ers' actions explicit: 'Just as our Founding Fathers of this Country
shook off their shackles of bondage, so must we." 17
Because of the militias' paranoia, racism, and violence, many
Americans are instinctively inclined to repudiate their theory of the
Second Amendment. This Part, by contrast, will attempt to consider
the extent to which militia thinking mirrors the Framers' view of the
Amendment.18 In particular, the militias and the Framers would
agree on four central ideas: fear of government, the right to revolu-
tion, the importance of militias, and the danger of disarmament. To-
gether, these ideas comprise a theory not only of the right to bear
arms, but also of the general relationship between the government
and the governed. Later Parts of this Article argue that the militias
also disagree with the Framers on important points. That disagree-
ment, however, should not obscure the broad areas of consensus.
A. Fear of the Government
Both the Framers and the militias would assert that citizens
should fear the government in general, and the federal government
in particular, because the interests of office-holders may diverge from
the interests of the citizenry. Belief in the political importance of a
citizen militia emerged in Anglo-American political thought of the
seventeenth century as part of a collection of ideas now loosely la-
belled "civic republicanism."1 9 Civic republicans thought that both
citizens and governments should promote the common good of the
people, rather than their own selfish interests; in the jargon of the
day, they should act virtuously. Both citizens and governments, how-
ever, tended to pursue their private interests at the expense of the
common good; in the jargon of the day, they tended to become cor-
rupt. The central task for politics, therefore, was to find a way to
cause political actors to behave with virtue.2 0
Because the Crown plotted to expand its own power at the ex-
pense of the citizenry, government virtue was a scarce commodity in
eighteenth century London. The monarch's chief strategy was to
bribe citizens, causing them to sell their virtue for preference. Thus,
16 See Militia of MontanaDeclaration (flyer) (on file with the author); LINDA THOMPSON,
AMEICAN JUSTIcE FOUNDATION, DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF 1994 1-3 (on file with
the author), reprinted in STERN, supra note 14, app. 102.
17 See Militia of Montana Declaration, supra note 16, at 5.
18 In the following parts, I summarize my analysis of the Framers' intent from David
C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendmen 101
YALE LJ. 551, 563-86 (1991).
19 See id. at 572-84.
20 SeeJ.G.A. PococK, THE MACHIAVELLAN MOMENT 66-75, 204-05 (1975); WOOD, supra
note 8, at 53-57, 118-19; Williams, supra note 18, at 563-67.
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the king subverted Parliament by giving places and pensions in the
royal service to compliant Members of Parliament.2 1 He taxed and
borrowed, so that men of finance would have an interest in the eco-
nomic well-being of the monarchy.22 Finally, he promoted a standing
army that depended on him for its livelihood and therefore would
enforce his will through armed might.23 The common danger in all
of these devices was that the king created a class of citizens whose
personal interests departed from the common good.
Although republican fears of royal conspiracy were born under
the Stuart monarchs, 24 the American revolutionaries believed that the
House of Hanover bred tyrants as well. In the actions of George III,
they saw a reprise of the plotting ofJames II,25just as the militias today
believe the actions of the Clinton Administration are a reprise of the
government of George III. After the revolution, many of the Framers
believed that citizens should fear even a popularly elected govern-
ment, because the interests of governors could always stray from the
interests of the governed, just as the interests of the king's dependents
had strayed from the interests of the British people.2 6 In addition,
some of the Framers feared the new central government above all,
because of its distance from the people. These men became the chief
sponsors of a federal bill of rights to control the monster.2 7
Indeed, modern theorists of the Second Amendment would
probably agree on only one point: fear of the central government
largely inspired the Amendment. For the last several decades, opin-
ion about the meaning of the Amendment has fallen into two general
camps. The first camp, the "collective rights" view, reads the provision
narrowly by focusing on its first clause: "A well regulated Militia, be-
21 See LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOL-
oGY 42-43, 49-51 (1978); POCOCK, supra note 20, at 406-08; WOOD, supra note 8, at 32-34.
22 See BANNING, supra note 21, at 65-66.
23 See LAWRENCE D. CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMS: THE ARMY AND MILITIA IN AMERICAN SOCI-
EY TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 23-25 (1982); POCOCK, supra note 20, at 413; W.A. SPECK,
RELUCTANT REVOLUTIONARIES 155 (1988); Williams, supra note 18, at 572.
24 See Andrew Fletcher, A Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias, in SELECTED
POLITICAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 1, 10 (David Daiches ed., 1979); John Trenchard &
Thomas Gordon, Cato's Letters No. 94, reprinted in THE ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE 222-
23 (David L.Jacobson ed., 1965); SPEcK, supra note 23, at 145-46, 154-56 (documenting the
suspicion caused by the support of a standing army and royal influence on judges).
25 See BANNING, supra note 21, at 78-80 (discussing the impact on colonists of the de-
caying control of the monarchy); WOOD, supra note 8, at 32-34 (discussing the King's
power to destroy the constitutional balance in England).
26 According to Akhil R. Amar, this divergence is an example of "agency costs": the
interests of the agent (government) departing from the interests of the principal (the peo-
ple). Amar argues that these costs formed the core concern of the Framers. Their desire,
in his view, was less to create private individual liberties and more to empower the citizenry
to control a dangerous government. See Akhil K Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1133 (1991).
27 See Williams, supra note 18, at 575-77.
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ing necessary to the security of a free State .... ,"28 According to pro-
ponents of this view, the amendment protects arms-bearing only
within a state militia in order to counter the great power of the Fed-
eral Government.2 9 The second camp, the "individual rights" view,
reads the provision more broadly by focusing on its second clause:
"the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed."30 According to proponents of this view, the Amendment
guarantees an individual right to own arms to "the people," meaning
all of the people, not just militia members, in order to resist federal
tyranny among other reasons.3' While these two views differ over who
possesses the right, militia members or all citizens, they nonetheless
agree that the impetus behind the right was a concern about federal
corruption.3 2
In their fear of the federal government, the rhetoric of the mod-
em private militias closely tracks the rhetoric of the Framers. Like
early civic republicans, the militia groups fear that the interests of gov-
ernment officials have dangerously diverged from the interests of the
citizenry, and that office-holders are conspiring to empower them-
selves at the expense of the American people. Thus, Linda Thomp-
son declaims: "The federal judicial offices and congress have set
themselves wholly apart from and above the people, immune even
from suit for their transgressions, answerable to none, and responsive
to none except those who further their private interests."33 MOM
urges citizens not to "leave our fate in the hands of corrupted, self
serving, foreign mercenaries [in the federal government]" or to "trust
our fate to their decisions, which are fostered by agencies of our gov-
ernment and private corporations in it's [sic] employ."34 Warning of
martial law to come, Federal Lands Update explains: "Most of the citi-
zens keep saying; 'Aren't those people we sent back to Washington
28 U.S. CONsT. amend. IL
29 See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1365, 1372-74
(1993); Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Cen-
tury: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 31-34 (1989); Dennis A.
Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendmen4 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107, 108 (1991).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
31 See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of the State: Bearing Arms,
Arming Militias, and the Second Amendmen4 26 VAL. U. L. Ray. 131 (1991); Don B. Kates,Jr.,
Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendmen4 82 MICH. L. Rav. 204
(1983); Sanford Levinson, TheEmbarrassing Second Amendmen 99 YAIY L.J. 637 (1989); Nel-
son Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right of Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L.
Ray. 103 (1987); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms,
43 DuuE L.J. 1236 (1994).
32 See Bogus, supra note 29, at 1373-74; Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 29, at 33-34;
Henigan, supra note 29, at 116-19; Kates, supra note 31, at 221-25; Levinson, supra note 31,
at 646-50; Lund, supra note 31, at 107-08; Van Alstyne, supra note 31, at 1244-46.
33 Declaration of Independence of 1994, reprinted in STERN, supra note 14, app. 102.
34 MiLrriA OF MONTANA, THE MILITnA 8 (pamphlet from MOM in Noxon, Montana)
(on file with the author).
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representing our interests?' Frankly no, they are not! - Most have liter-
ally isolated themselves from their constituents .... 35 In a similar
manner, the Free Militia predicts: "The fact that officials are infring-
ing gun rights on every front is simply a manifestation of their inner
tendency to empower themselves. Left unchecked, this tendency will
lead to genuine tyranny."36
Echoing the rhetoric of civic republicanism, the militia groups
also fear that the federal government will use a standing army to en-
force its will against an unsuspecting citizenry. Thus, Linda Thomp-
son lists as one of the "Train of Abuses": "The federal government has
kept among us, in Times of Peace, Standing Armies, without the con-
sent of our [state] Legislatures, or through the seduction or coercion
of the state legislatures through the mechanism of 'federal tax mon-
ies'.... ",37 Militia writers worry particularly that members of the mili-
tary might participate in federal schemes to disarm the American
public.38
The militia's fear of government's armed might focuses not only
on the U.S. military, but also on federal law enforcement agencies,
particularly the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). In
the militia's view, the paramilitary equipment and training of federal
agencies make them resemble more a standing army than conven-
tional police: 'Jack-booted, helmeted, armor-vested 'law enforce-
ment' S.W.A.T. teams now conduct KGB-type raids by kicking down
doors in the middle of the night."39 Observers believe that two recent
35 Jim Faulkner, Martial Law and Emergency Powers, FEDERAL LANDS UPDATE, Nov. 1994,
at 5. As its title suggests, Federal Lands Update sees the threat of tyranny particularly evident
in federal land policy and environmental regulation.
36 THE FREE MILITIA, FIELD MANUAL SECTION § 1 at 47 (1994) (on file with the au-
thor). A particularly malignant expression of this idea comes from the neo-Nazi National
Alliance. A flyer explains that "FREE MONEY CAN BE YOURS-if you are an 80-IQ wel-
fare mother," an illegal alien, a "member ofJewish organized crime gangs" or a "homosex-
ual 'performance artist.'" On the other hand, "all this free money is not available to you if
you are an ordinary straight White American, a descendant of the men and women of
Europe who discovered, pioneered, and built America." Instead, "yourjob is to work hard
to provide all the free money and free goodies that the criminals-uh, I mean the politi-
cians-like to give away to buy the votes of the minority and the special interest voting
blocs." FREE MONEY (National Alliance) (on file with the author).
37 THoMPSON, supra note 16, app. 102. Note the implicit analogy to the actions of the
British crown in the seventeenth century. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
38 For example:
U.S. Marines were asked if they would be willing to KILL American civilians
who resisted confiscation of privately owned firearms. The sad commentary
on that question was that the U.S. Marine Corp [sic]; in which we all have a
son, daughter, grandchild, relative, or an acquaintance just down the street,
in that tightly regimented organization; the overwhelming answer was YES!
Sad, but true.
Faulkner, supra note 35, at 6.
39 John Grady, U.S. Government Initiates Open Warfare Against American People, MILTrrIA
NEws, Collector's Edition 1994, at 2, reprinted in STERN, supra note 14, app. 104.
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ATF actions, the assault on the Branch Davidian Compound and the
siege of white-supremacist Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge, contributed
significantly to the recent dramatic rise in militia membership.4° In-
deed, McVeigh's principal target in the Murrah Building might have
been the ATF office. The bombing occurred on April 19, 1995, two
years to the day after the Waco assault, and militia members were very
aware of the importance of that date. 41 MOM, for example, an-
nounced in its newsletter:
1. APRIL 19, 1775: Lexington burned; 2. APRIL 19, 1943: Warsaw
burned; 3. APRIL 19, 1992: The feds attempted to raid Randy
Weaver, but had their plans thwarted when concerned citizens ar-
rived on the scene with supplies for the Weaver family totally una-
ware of what was to take place; 4. APRIL 19, 1993: The Branch
Davidians burned; 5. APRIL 19, 1995: Richard Snell will be exe-
cuted-UNLESS WE ACT NOW!!! 4 2
Like the Framers of the Second Amendment, militia writers focus
on corruption primarily in the federal government, rather than in lo-
cal legislatures. To be sure, the militias do not trust any government.
For example, Samuel Sherwood reportedly instructed militia mem-
bers to "look [state] legislators in the face because some day you may
be forced to blow it off."43 Linda Thompson attributes corruption in
the state legislature to federal bribes.44 One element of the militia
movement, the Posse Comitatus, active primarily during the 1980s
40 See, e.g., Beth Hawkins, Patriot Games, DErlorr Mzrto TIMES, Oct. 12-18, 1994, at 14;
Hate Movement Shifts Tactics in 1994, KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Southern Poverty
Law Center, Montgomery, Alabama), Mar. 1995, at 9, 11; Philip Weiss, Off the Grid, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, § 6, at 24, 29-30, 44-52.
41 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 1, at 32-34.
42 Richard Snell Update, TAKING AIM (MOM, Noxon, MT), Mar. 1995, at 7. Snell was a
convicted murderer with ties to the militia movement. See id. at 8; Jo Thomas & Ronald
Smothers, Oklahoma City Bombing Was Target of Plot as Early as '83, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 1995, at A6. References to Waco and Ruby Ridge abound in the militia materials.
The Militia News, for example, opines:
The recent 51 day siege and massacre of nearly one hundred men, women
and children in Waco, Texas, was a crime of the greatest magnitude. It was
a cruel, sadistic, brutal crime. It was a crime which violated nearly every
article of the Bill of Rights .... It resembled the burning and obliteration
of Christian cities and the annihilation of their inhabitants by Mogul
hordes in earlier centuries.
Grady, supra note 39, at 2-3. About Ruby Ridge, The Free Militia recounts: "The BATF
attempted to entrap Randy Weaver in Idaho. When he refused to become one of their
henchmen, his cabin was put under 24-hour BATF surveillance, leading to a surprise con-
frontation that left Weaver's son and wife dead and Weaver acquitted of any wrongdoing."
THE FREE MILrrrA, supra note 36, at 43.
43 Chris Bouneff, Leader: Militia Misunderstood, IDAHO Pams-TRm., Apr. 9, 1995, at 4A.
Sherwood has denied the statement. Id.
44 THOMPSON, supra note 16, app. 102.
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maintains that government above the county level is illegitimate.45
The overwhelming bulk of militia attention, however, focuses on the
federal government. As Part III explains, the militias believe that the
central government is the locus of a conspiracy to destroy America.
Accordingly, the revolution will involve a battle between federal forces
and the citizenry. In this Manichean formulation, states are not a
principal actor-for good or ill.46
Although they share a fear of federal conspiracy, modem militias
and the Framers of the Second Amendment would not share a com-
mon view of the villains behind the conspiracy. Eighteenth-century
revolutionaries did notfear that socialists, the United Nations, secular
humanists, 47 or Jews were likely to dominate the governments in
Whitehall or Washington.48 However, those differences 49 should not
obscure the common ground. The Framers of the Second Amend-
ment warned citizens to be alert to the danger of corruption in the
federal government, and the militias believe that they, alone among
Americans, have heeded that warning.
B. The Revolutionary Second Amendment
The Framers and the modem militias would also agree that a pur-
pose of the Second Amendment was to allow the people, organized
into militias, to make a revolution against a corrupt federal govern-
ment, not to allow private individuals to defend themselves against
other private individuals.50 Concern about revolution permeated the
discussion over the proposed ight-to-arms provision. By contrast,
45 SeeJMtEs CORCORAN, BITTER HARvEST 27 (1990) (noting that the Posse Comitatus
takes its name from the Latin for "power of the country").
46 See Bouneff, supra note 43, at 4A. Samuel Sherwood, for example, issued his threat
against state legislators because he believes that they might side with the central govern-
ment in the coming civil war.
47 Some Framers believed that religious establishment was necessary to maintain a
virtuous state, but others were rationalist Deists who believed that traditional religion could
only benight the government. See David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and
Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. Ray. 769, 853-58 (1991) (considering the views of James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson). In any event, modem secular humanism did not even
exist in the eighteenth century for the Framers to worry about. The drafters of the Bill of
Rights worried that some particular religious denomination, not humanists, might take
over the federal government. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 124-26 (James Madison) (I.
Kramnick ed., 1986). As a result, they adopted the Establishment and Free Exercise
clauses along with the Second Amendment.
48 On the other hand, shorn of its anti-semitism, the militia writers' worry about a
conspiracy by international financiers has some resonance in the civic republican concern
about banking, taxes, and credit as instruments of governmental corruption of the citi-
zenry. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
49 Indeed, those differences explain why the militias mistake themselves for the Body
of the People: Militia writers construct a traitorous Other composed of whoever disagrees
with them. See infra part ll.B.2.
50 See Williams, supra note 18, at 586-88.
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none of the central actors even mentioned a right of self-defense. Af-
ter all, the Framers had just successfully revolted against one imperial
government, and they were concerned that they might need to make a
repeat performance. 51
The right of the people to bear arms prevented oppression by a
new imperial government in three ways. First, an anned popular mili-
tia made it less likely that the government would adopt a standing
army. Second, it would give the government pause before oppressing
the people. Most importantly, the Second Amendment gave the peo-
ple the power to overthrow a corrupt government.52 Consider the Vir-
ginia legislature's draft proposal for the amendment, which was
penned by George Mason and provided the foundation for Madison's
draft of the Second Amendment.53 It reads:
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well-
regulated militia, composed of the body of the people trained to
arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state; that
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and
therefore ought to be avoided .... 54
Similarly, Elbridge Gerry offered the only explanation of the
meaning of the amendment during the Congressional debates:
This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended to secure the people
against the mal-administration of the Government; if we could sup-
pose that, in all cases, the rights of the people would be attended to,
the occasion for guards of this kind would be removed.... What,
sir, is the use of the militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a
standing army, the bane of liberty.55
Virtually all modern Second Amendment theorists agree that one
purpose of the provision was to make resistance to the federal govern-
ment possible.56 Again, the two camps disagree over who possesses
the right, state militias or the mass of individuals.57 The individual
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. Proponents of the amendment were especially wor-
ried that Congress might abuse its new powers of "organizing, arming, and disciplining,
the Militia" by disarming popular militias and thus removing the main potential source of
resistance to a federal army. See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 29, at 29.
52 See Williams, supra note 18, at 572-86.
53 See STEPHEN HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 75 (1984).
54 Id.; 2 BERNARD ScHwARTz, THE BiLL OF RIGHTs: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 842
(1971).
55 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 749-50 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). These two examples are
illustrative of many similar statements. For interested readers, most Second Amendment
scholarship bristles with similar quotations.
56 See sources cited supra note 31.
57 Compare Bogus, supra note 29, at 1372-73 (arguing that the notion of a constitution-
ally guaranteed individual right to bear arms is a myth) and Ehrman & Henigan, supra note
29, at 21-34 (arguing that the Second Amendment is aimed at a military-related right to
bear arms) and Henigan, supra note 29, at 114-15 (arguing that the Framers viewed the
militia as an instrument of governmental authority) with Kates, supra note 31, at 214-20
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rights view accepts that revolution was the main reason for the amend-
ment but argues that self-defense was a secondary aim. Proponents
sometimes admit that the historical materials contain few references
to such a purpose,58 but nonetheless argue that such a goal was im-
plicit.59 Again, such disagreements should not obscure the underly-
ing consensus: the Second Amendment ensures the possibility of
revolution against the central government by someone under some
circumstances.
The militias are thus correct that the right of revolution has a
more secure home in the Second Amendment than does a right of
self-defense. The MOM T-shirt that announces, "The Second Amend-
ment isn't about hunting or target-shooting .. . It's about FREE-
DOM!", 60 captures militia sentiment. Similarly, Linda Thompson
announced: "The militia is what the Second Amendment is about,
because it isn't about hunting ducks; it's about hunting politicians."61
MOM further explains:
The majority of American's [sic] today, believe the reason that our
fore fathers [sic] wanted the people to have the right to keep and
bear arms was for the purpose of self defense against criminals,
hunting, etc. This is NOT the primary reason for the enactment of
the 2nd Amendment. Let's let Thomas Jefferson explain it for us:
"The strongest reason for the people to retain the right to keep and bear arms
is, as a last resort, to protect themselves against tyranny in government."62
(arguing that the Second Amendment guarantees the people's right to possess arms) and
Lund, supra note 31, at 111-12 (arguing that the Second Amendment protects an individ-
ual's right to keep and bear arms) and Van Alstyne, supra note 31, at 1241-44 (noting that
the right belongs to the common citizen rather than a standing army).
58 See, e.g., Lund, supra note 31, at 111-12, 118.
Nicholas Johnson has argued that the Ninth Amendment offers a firmer basis for a
constitutional right of self-defense than the Second Amendment. Nicholas Johnson, Be-
yond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment,
24 RUTGERS LJ. 1, 1-16 (1992). Robert Shalhope argues that there is direct historical sup-
port for the idea that the Second Amendment protects a right of self-defense. Robert
Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69J. AM. HIsT. 599, 604-12 (1982).
His sources, however, do not support this claim. See Williams, supra note 18, at 587 n.198.
59 Nelson Lund, for example, has argued that general liberal theory guarantees a
right to self-defense, and the Second Amendment should be interpreted broadly in light of
liberal theory. Lund, supra note 31, at 117-23.
Don Kates has argued that the Framers believed that the right of revolution originates
from a more basic Lockean right of self-defense, so that in protecting the specific right of
revolution, they really meant to protect the more general right of self-defense. Kates, supra
note 31, at 244. As Part Two of this Article will explain, the individualism inherent in these
arguments is not consistent with the civic republicanism that produced the Second Amend-
ment. Accordingly, a personal right of self-defense is a poor candidate for inclusion in the
range of implicit Second Amendment rights, whatever they may be.
60 See supra text accompanying notes 12-49.
61 Six O'Clock Newscast (Indianapolis Eyewitness News, May 1, 1995).
62 THE MILMA, supra note 34, at 3.
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Like the Framers, then, the militia believe in a general right to
revolution. Militia writers also extol all three specific benefits of the
right to arms espoused by the Framers. First, as the last section illus-
trates, they fear a standing army,6 3 and as the next section explains,
they trust a popular militia.64 Second, they believe that an armed pop-
ulace can check an oppressive central government from becoming op-
pressive. Often, militia writers make this point by examining the
dynamics of fear between a government and its citizens: it is inevita-
ble that one will fear the other, and it is important that fear flow from
the government toward the citizens, rather than the other way. Thus,
MOM attributes to Thomas Jefferson the statement: "When govern-
ments fear the people there is liberty. When the people fear the gov-
ernment there is tyranny. '65 At another point, MOM explains: "If the
militia is independent and viable, then only laws which are right and
just will come forth from the government.. .. -"66 Similarly, in issuing
its "CALL TO ARMS!," the Free Militia exhorted that "[y]our right
and duty is to arm and organize yourself' because "[t] he more citizens
that own guns, the less willing the government will be to threaten
US."
6 7
Finally, if the government does become oppressive, an armed
population can make a revolution and take control. Federal Lands Up-
date makes the point directly: "IF THE GOVERNMENT USES ITS
FORCE AGAINST THE CITIZENS, THE PEOPLE CAN RESPOND
WITH A SUPERIOR AMOUNT OF ARMS, AND APPROPRIATELY
DEFEND THEIR RIGHTS!"68 Many militia writers rely directly (and
more or less accurately) on the writing of the Framers for this proposi-
tion. ThomasJefferson and Patrick Henry are favorites. The Free Mi-
litia instructs its members to "MEMORIZE: 'That whenever any Form
of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of
the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new Govern-
ment.' ' 69 The Second Amendment Militia also quotes Jefferson in
urging prospective members tojoin: "The Spirit of Resistance to Gov-
ernment is so valuable on certain occasions that I wish it to be always
kept alive."70 Henry's famous "liberty or death" speech makes regular
appearances in the militia literature:
63 See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
64 See infra part II.B.
65 Militia of Montana Declaration, supra note 16, at 5.
66 The Militia, supra note 34, at 8.
67 THE FREE MiLrIa, supra note 36, at 47.
68 Jim Faulkner, Why There is a Need For the Militia in America, FEDERAL LANDS UPDATE,
Oct. 1994, at 6.
69 THE FREE MnrirA, supra note 36, at 39 (quoting from the Declaration of
Independence).
70 Application, supra note 14.
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We are not weak if we make a proper use of those means which the
God of nature has placed in our power. Millions of people armed
in the holy cause of liberty, and in such a country as that which we
possess, are invincible.... Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be
purchased at the price of chains and slavery? forbid [sic] it, Al-
mighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me,
give me liberty or give me death!7 1
C. The Importance of the Militia
Like the Framers, modem militia writers believe that the right to
bear arms belongs in the hands of an organized militia, not just pri-
vate individuals who happen to own guns. That claim lands them in
the middle of the pivotal controversy in Second Amendment scholar-
ship, so a description of the parameters of that debate is in order. In
some sense, every participant in the Second Amendment debate
agrees that the Framers gave the right to arms to a militia, but we
disagree over the exact makeup of that militia. In my view, the Fram-
ers believed that the militia must be organized so as to be universal
and virtuous. In the militias' view, the militia should be organized, so
that it will be effective; it may be universal, but it need not. The mili-
tia writers are thus correct that the militia must be organized, but are
wrong about the reasons for that organization-effectiveness rather
than universality and virtue.
This error leads to a more fundamental mistake: I believe that
militia writers are wrong in believing that a Second Amendment mili-
tia may legitimately be less than universal. On this point the militias
agree with both the states' right and individual rights positions. The
individual rights view holds that the Amendment gives every private
individual the right to own arms necessary to stage a revolution. In
the language of the Amendment, the right belongs to "the people,"
and in the eighteenth century the militia included all citizens capable
of bearing arms.7 2 In this view, therefore, the militia need be neither
organized, universal, nor virtuous, because the militia is only another
name for all private gun-owners. The states' rights view holds that the
Second Amendment gives a right to bear arms only to state militias,
because the purpose of the Second Amendment was to safeguard a
"well-regulated militia." Because the modem incarnation of the mili-
tia is the National Guard, the Amendment is nothing more than a
71 Grady, supra note 39, at 4. Other militia writers rely on another familiar impreca-
tion by Henry:. "Guard with jealous attention the public liberty. Suspect every one who
approaches thatjewel. Unfortunately, nothing will preserve it but downright force. When-
ever you give up that force, you are ruined." SHERWOOD, supra note 15, at 60.
72 See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 53, at 84-87; Kates, supra note 81, at 211-20; Levin-
son, supra note 31, at 646-47.
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protection of a state's right to maintain a National Guard. 73 Thus, in
the states' rights view, the militia must be organized as part of the
National Guard, but the National Guard need not be universal.
As Part II will elaborate, 74 neither of these views are correct. Con-
trary to the states' rights view, the militia of the eighteenth century
included every citizen; it had to include every citizen because with the
right to bear arms came the right to revolution. Any lesser body was,
in the language of the Framers, a "select militia"-a mere slice or seg-
ment of society, and a revolution by such a faction would benefit the
faction, not the People as a whole. The modem National Guard is not
a universal militia. Thus, protection for the Guard will not satisfy the
demands of the Second Amendment.75
The individual rights view suffers similar problems. Contrary to
that view, the militia of the eighteenth century was not just a random
collection of private individuals who owned arms and who spontane-
ously turned out on the same day to resist the government. The state
raised the militia (although the militia might later resist the state) to
ensure its universality and virtue, because only the state is a universal
body. Like the National Guard, private gun-owners are not a universal
body; they are less than the whole and demographically skewed.76
A universal militia, then, is a very particular and, for the Framers,
a very important concept. It is the same as neither the National
Guard nor the totality of private gun-owners. For the Framers, only a
universal militia could reliably protect the common good by force of
arms, because only a universal militia encompasses the People as a
body. Neither the states' rights, nor the individual rights view takes
this requirement of universality seriously enough: force must reside in
the hands of the whole. Without a universal militia, the Second Amend-
ment is hollow. A modem militia must include all of the citizenry; any
smaller group will not qualify.
As Part III will explain, modem militia writers also fail to appreci-
ate the importance of universality. They believe that their private and
highly partial militia groups constitute Second Amendment militias.
They tend to confuse their own interests with the common good and
their own organizations with the American people. Despite that con-
fusion, they do understand two important features of a Second
73 See, e.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisriUsr 95, 227 n.76 (1980); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988);John Levin, The Right to Bear
Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 48 CHI.-KmENT L. REV. 148, 158-59 (1971);
Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second
Amendment 2 HASTNGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 999 (1975).
74 For more detailed exposition of this argument, see Williams, supra note 18, at 588-
94.
75 See id. at 589.
76 See id. at 590-93.
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Amendment militia. Unlike the states' rights theorists, militia writers
acknowledge that the eighteenth-century militia included the whole
citizenry; and unlike the individual rights theorists, they believe that
the militia must be organized. Their only error is their failure to
grasp that the reason for organization was to ensure universality.
To demonstrate that the revolutionary militia included the whole
citizenry, militia writers again rely on the Framers. The Militia News
quotes George Mason stating, "I ask sir, what is the militia? It is the
whole people, except for a few public officials." 77 Samuel Sherwood
roughly quotes Richard Henry Lee: "A militia, when properly formed,
are in fact the people themselves .... [T]he constitution ought to
secure a genuine force and guard against a select [i.e. less than univer-
sal] militia, by providing that the militia shall always be kept well or-
ganized, armed, and disciplined, and include ... all men capable of
bearing arms."78 More succinctly, Federal Lands Update claims: "Our
Founding Fathers defined WE THE PEOPLE as the militia. ... "79
Similarly, MOM maintains that "[i] t was not the army, or the bureau-
cratic officials, members of parliament or Governors who made up the
Revolutionary militia . . . . It was John Q. Public-the common
man."80 Militia writers further explain that under current law, U.S.
armed forces are divided into the National Guard and the organized
militia on the one hand and the unorganized militia on the other.
According to these writers, the latter consists of the bulk of the citi-
zenry and constitutes the militia contemplated by the Second
Amendment. 81
77 Grady, supra note 14, at 5.
78 SHERWOOD, supra note 15, at 58.
Lee actually wrote: "[T he constitution ought to secure a genuine and guard against a
select militia .... " RICHARD H. LEE, AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL
FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 169 (1788). By this assertion, he meant that the Constitution
should secure a genuine (i.e., universal) militia and forbid a select (i.e., less than univer-
sal) militia. See Williams, supra note 18, at 594.
79 Faulkner, supra note 68, at 6.
80 THE MiLTrrIA, supra note 34, at 7. The Second Amendment Committee purports to
derive this conclusion from a linguistic analysis of the Amendment itself. According to
A.C. Brocki, teacher of Advanced English, a foremost expert in grammar, former Senior
Editor for Houghton Mifflin, the sentence means that the people are the militia. Smith,
supra note 14.
81 Definitions of the unorganized militia vary. Federal Lands Update asserts that the
unorganized militia consists of every "able bodied male between 18 and 65." This defini-
tion is "a true vestige of the intent of the Founding Fathers and a heritage of the Guaran-
tee of the Second Amendment." See Faulkner, supra note 68, at 6. MOM explains that the
unorganized militia includes "all able-bodied citizen's [sic] of this state" and "therefor
[sic], the unorganized militia conforms with 'Militia' as provided for in the second amend-
ment." THE MILIrIA, supra note 34, at 6.
In fact, current law defines the unorganized militia as all males between the ages of 17
and 45 and all female officers of the national guard. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1994). At present,
that definition has no functional significance. The Code does not provide for the arming,
equipping, organizing, training, or funding of the unorganized militia. In fact, § 311
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Like the individual rights theorists, militia writers maintain that
the militia must be comprised of the people as a whole unorganized
by the government. Unlike the individual rights theorists, however,
they emphasize that the Second Amendment contemplates that the
people should organize themselves into militias, in order effectively to
combat government. Indeed, this aspect of militia thinking is really
what sets these movements apart, what most attracts members,8 2 and
what most alarms fellow citizens. Many Americans believe that the
Second Amendment protects their private right to own guns, but mili-
tia members go further. The militias are organizing and arming
themselves as intentional political activity. Thus, MOM argues:
Many feel that it is too much to have a militia, that we need to just
settle for the possession of arms.... [But] [t]he militia, under the
second amendment, is to be able to bare [sic] arms, meaning to use
them in a military confrontation. Not just pack them around the
house, yard or forest. To stand on the second amendment means
that you are willing, able, and have desires of belonging to a militia,
to whom the right of keeping and bearing arms is guaranteed.83
Similarly, Federal Lands Update maintains: "The security of a free state
is not found in the citizens having guns in the closet. It is found in the
citizenry being trained, organized, equipped and led properly .... 8 4
The Free Militia exhorts: "You need to be organized, equipped,
trained, and coordinated with other like-minded men to effectively
stand up to the growing arrogance of the federal government. It was
said during the American Revolution that 'United we stand, divided
we fall.' This is still true today."85 The Second Amendment Commit-
tee explains the meaning of the provision: "By putting the militia at
the forefront of the sentence which composes the Second Amend-
ment of the Bill of Rights, [the Framers] stressed the importance of
the collective use of the right to arms."8 6
seems to do only one thing- it allows those citizens who fit the statutory definition to
proclaim that they are members of the militia, as militia writers are eager to do. For exam-
ple, Linda Thompson, who does not appear to fit the definition, has proclaimed herself
"Acting Adjutant General" of the Unorganized Militia of the United States "[p]ursuant to
10 U.S.C. § 311 and Articles I and II of the Bill of Rights." Linda Thompson, Ultimatum to
Each Member .of the United States House of Representatives and United States Senate
(Apr. 19, 1994) (on file with author).
82 Ray Southwell, co-founder of the Michigan Militia, explained the appeal: "What
I've found is that people are so angry they're loose cannons.... They come into the militia
and their anger level drops. Now we have a common goal, a common good. He's realized
he's not alone." Beth Hawkins, Conspiratorial Views, DETRorT METRo-TIMEs, Oct. 12-18,
1994, at 13.
83 THE MILITIA, supra note 34, at 7.
84 Faulkner, supra note 68, at 6.
85 THE FREE MILrrA, supra note 36, at 47.
86 Smith, supra note 14.
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As the last quotation illustrates, there is a certain irony in the
militias' focus on the collective rights aspect of the Second Amend-
ment. Militia groups, who are more pro-gun and anti-government
than the National Rifle Association, agree with the states' rights theo-
rists-who are generally anti-gun-that the militia clause is crucial to
the provision's meaning. By contrast, some proponents of the individ-
ual rights view who share the militia's enthusiasm for guns have
sought to de-emphasize the importance of the introductory clause of
the Amendment, because they believe that the right belongs to the
"people," not to a formal militia.8 7
The irony, however, is more apparent than real, because the
states' rights theorists and the militia groups mean very different
things when they refer to the militia. The former group views the
militia as the National Guard, a public body firmly under governmen-
tal control. Militia writers, by contrast, believe that the right to arms
belongs to private, voluntary militias recruited and organized in-
dependent of the government. As one writer explains, "[a]t no time
in our history since the colonies declared their independence from
the long train of abuses of King George, has our country needed a
network of active militias across America to protect us from the mon-
ster we have allowed our federal government to become."88 To the
militia writer, the right to bear arms is essentially individual: private
citizens with private arms should individually agree to band together,
pooling their resources to make them more effective.
In other words, although the militia writers are right that the rev-
olutionary militia included the whole citizenry and that the militia
must be organized, they fail to reach the logical conclusion: a mod-
em Second Amendment militia must be organized by the state to be
universal; it may not rest on the private decisions of individuals to
enlist.8 9 For militia writers, militia membership is the highest form of
Second Amendment patriotism for purely practical reasons. A gun in
the closet or the woods does the resistance movement no good at all;
only if individuals unite can they hope to resist the behemoth in
Washington. Significantly absent from this analysis, however, are the
political and moral concerns held by the Framers: for civic republi-
cans, only if the militia literally encompasses the whole will it safe-
guard the interests of the whole, the Common Good. In other words,
the Framers were suspicious of everyone who held power, militias as
87 Notoriously, that clause does not appear in most of the NRA's promotional mate-
rial. See OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE 134-35 (1993).
88 Faulkner, supra note 68, at 6.
89 In this sense, it is not enough that American citizens have a universal right to own
arms or to join a militia; the militia must in fact be universal. Otherwise, whenever there is
a revolution, it will be made in the interests of the faction that actually holds the arms.
See Williams, supra note 18, at 593-94.
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well as the government. As Part III will argue, the private militias pres-
ently organizing in this country are select, not universal, and the
Framers would fear them as much as they would fear the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. The militias do not worry that they
might be partial; instead, they blithely assume that, however few their
numbers, they are the People.90 For them, the reason to have more
members is not to guard against partiality. The reason to have more
members is simply to have more guns.
D. The Danger of Disarmament
To summarize, the Framers and the militia writers would agree
that the federal government is continually at risk of becoming corrupt
and using a standing army against the people, that the People have a
right to resist tyranny by force of arms, but that the only effective safe-
guard against oppression is universal, armed militia membership.
The final proposition inevitably follows: before the government at-
tempts to impose an oppressive regime, it always seeks first to disarm
the citizenry so as to make it helpless. The populace should therefore
always fear gun control as a sign of despotic designs afoot.
The immediate (though perhaps not the only) concern prompt-
ing the Second Amendment was a fear that the federal government
might use its Article I powers to disarm the militia and pave the way
for tyranny. Antifederalist John DeWitt, for example, warned:
"[Members of Congress] at their pleasure may arm or disarm all or
any part of the freemen of the United States, so that when their army
is sufficiently numerous, they may put it out of the power of the
freemen militia of America to assert and defend their liberties .... ."91
Elbridge Gerry, in the floor debate of the amendment also cautioned:
"Whenever Governments mean to invade the rights and liberties of
the people, they always attempt to destroy the militia, in order to raise
an army upon their ruins."92
Militia writers agree; indeed, they think that the conspiracy has
already begun. Federal Lands Update explains:
Why is the federal government in such a hurry to take away the guns
of honest, law abiding citizens? Because once we are disarmed, we
become as sheep! And, the federal government, which has never
been a friend of those who insist upon enforcing their Second
Amendment rights, will come down hard upon it's [sic] people.93
The Militia News warns: "The state must first try to break our will to
resist, and then it must confiscate private firearms so that even with
90 See infra part ll.B.2.
91 THE ANTnFEDERALIST PAPERS 75 (Morton Borden ed., 1965).
92 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 55, at 750.
93 Faulkner, supra note 35, at 3.
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the desire and the will we will be unable to resist what is planned for
us. This is what gun control is all about."94 Another commentator
apocalyptically predicts:
In the coming confrontation between the public and the govern-
ment to disarm the citizenry, they may kill, arrest, imprison, and
seize assets from tens or even hundreds of thousands of Americans;
but they are unlikely to ever completely disarm the millions of
Americans who understand the Second Amendment to the Consti-
tution and the warnings of our founding fathers to never let the
government disarm them.95
The Militia Of Montana attributes such a view to Jefferson, claiming
that: "Thomas Jefferson also understood that those who would at-
tempt to take away the liberty of the citizen's [sic] of this nation must
first disarm them."96
According to militia writers, recent gun control statutes are part
of a general conspiracy to oppress the American people. Many militia
groups avow that Sarah Brady testified in support of the Brady Bill:
"Our task of creating a socialist America can only succeed when those
who will resist us have been TOTALLY DISARMED!" 97 They argue
that the same plot is behind the ban on assault weapons: "[A]ssault
rifles are the teeth of the Second Amendment. Without their bite,
there is nothing to prevent a draconian state from devouring all of
our precious liberties."98 Indeed, "[t] he really subversive thing about
these two bills is that they are aimed at limiting militias more than at
limiting crime." 99 MOM agrees: "Our government by passing these
Crime Bills and the Brady Bill have shown us that they are attempting
to disarm the militias of the several states."'100 Militia writers fear even
more dangerous federal action: "There are SEVEN (7) SEIZURE EX-
ECUTIVE ORDERS which can be enacted with the stroke of a bureau-
94 Grady, supra note 14, at 3.
95 McAavN-vh INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR, March 1994, at 20.
96 THE MiLrrA, supra note 34, at 3.
97 See Faulkner, supra note 35, at 1; Faulkner, supra note 68, at 2; THE MirrIA, supra
note 34, at 7. A single-page flyer distributed at militia meetings also bears the quoted
language and an attribution to Sarah Brady ("in HER OWN WORDS"), all in very large
letters so as to fill the whole page. BRADY FLYER (on file with the author).
98 THE FREE MiumA, supra note 36, at 47. According to the Detroit Metro Times, Michi-
gan Militia Leaders agree, saying that "semi-automatic weapons are militia-style arms.
Therefore, the only reason to ban them is to lay the groundwork for enslaving the popu-
lace." Beth Hawkins, Guns and Glory, DETROIT METRO TIMES, Oct. 12-18, 1994, at 12.
99 THE FREE MILrIA, supra note 36, at 42a. The description of these bills as "subver-
sive" seems ironic, coming from a group committed to subversion and regarding bills that
enjoyed popular support. As Part Three explains, however, this usage is consistent with
militia ideology they see themselves as the true American people and individuals who
oppose them are traitors or foreigners. Accordingly, the bills are subversive of the real
America.
100 THE MILrrIA, supra note 34, at 7-8.
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cratic pen and the nation will be plunged into an absolute dictatorial,
martial law mode of repression."'01
In the militias' view, this moment in history is critical for the
American people. As militias see it, if the country proceeds much fur-
ther down the road of disarmament, citizens will lose the ability to
resist, and freedom will' have flown from this land forever. Militia
groups view recent gun control legislation as a warning: an oppressive
government gains power by disarming the populace. The comparison
to Hitler's Germany is common. Federal Lands Update for example,
lists a series of analogies which begins: "1. In 1935, Adolph Hitler li-
censed all handguns. 2. In 1993, Bill Clinton licensed all hand-
guns."10 2 Similarly, the Free Militia asserts: "The U.S. 1968 Gun
Control Act is a word-for-word translation of Adolf Hitler's German
gun control laws of 1938 Nazi Germany."' 0 3 Furthermore, a flyer dis-
tributed at militia meetings bears an image of Hitler in stiff-armed
salute with the caption: "All in favor of 'gun control', raise your right
hand."10 4 More broadly, MOM argues that disarmament and suppres-
sion of the militia were responsible for oppression in East Timor, Po-
land, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Italy, and
Germany.105
Many observers agree that along with the Waco and Ruby Ridge
incidents, gun control statutes are responsible for the dramatic in-
crease in militia membership.106 For militia groups, such statutes are
not mere technical violations of the Second Amendment; they directly
attack the relationship between citizens and their government. In this
sense, militia groups maintain that the Second Amendment is the very
heart of the Constitution, because when Second Amendment rights
disappear, our other rights will quickly follow as there will be no
armed citizenry to defend them.10 7 The groups believe that modern
America is in the times that the Framers predicted: We can become
like Russia or Nazi Germany, or we can hold fast to the American way
of life, but only if we hold fast to our guns.
101 Faulkner, supra note 68, at 2.
102 Faulkner, supra note 35, at 5.
103 THE FREE MILITIA, supra note 36, at 42 (foomote omitted).
104 HITLER FLYER (on file with the author). To reinforce the message, the document
goes on: "Political prisoners and Death Camps can't exist without 'Gun Control'. [sic]
Some Americans still feel 'Gun Control' is a good idea. To save America from these Nazi-
lovers, we must destroy 'Gun Control'! [sic]" Id.
105 THE MiLITIA, supra note 34, at 6-7.
106 See, e.g., Beth Hawkins, Patriot Games, DETOIT MraEO TRMES, Oct. 12-18, 1994, at 13.
107 See Grady, supra note 14, at 6; Application, supra note 14; THE FREE MImrrlA, supra
note 36, at 47; SHERWOOD, supra note 15, at xv.
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II
WHAT THE MILITIA HAS WRONG-THE BODY OF THE PEOPLE
The militia movement, in short, offers a surprisingly sophisticated
and elaborate theory of the Second Amendment that tracks much of
the thinking of the Framers. Yet modem Americans, horrified by the
activity and rhetoric of many militia groups have reacted to this theory
with dismissal. The reason for these emotions is not hard to guess:
many Americans fear that a broad-based right to revolution will result
in anarchy and civil war. They doubt that citizens will all rise up to-
gether in a unified movement, sharing values and perceptions, against
a universally reviled government. Instead, if citizens each have an in-
dividual right to own arms so as to be ready for revolution, outrages
like Oklahoma City seem inevitable.' 08 In his own mind, Timothy Mc-
Veigh was probably only exercising his Second Amendment rights; the
fear is that there may be many more like him.
The Framers of the Second Amendment, however, also feared re-
bellion and civil war. In their view, the Second Amendment gave the
right only to make a unified, organic revolution, and it gave the right
only to a unified, organic people. For the amendment to apply in its
own terms, in other words, citizens must be a People capable of united
revolutionary action. In their formal, substantive analysis, modem
theorists of the amendment ignore this requirement: they simply as-
sert that the right belongs to the National Guard, individuals, or pri-
vate militia groups without examining whether those bodies constitute
a People. In their rhetoric, however, both individual rights theorists
and modern militia groups implicitly claim that Americans are a Peo-
ple: they assert that in time of revolution, the People will strike down
the current government and make a new one, in a spontaneous, de-
centralized but unified and organic revolutionary movement. In this
sense, these writers conjure with the concept of a People, by causing
us to imagine that such an entity exists without ever demonstrating or
even arguing that one does.
A. The Framers' View of the People
The Framers probably would have shared the modem fear of fac-
tional rebellion and the revulsion at the Oklahoma City bombing. In-
deed, no sooner had they completed a revolution against Great
Britain than they proceeded to repress rebellions at home, such as the
108 One interviewer expressed this worry to Norman Olson, co-founder of the Michi-
gan Militia, before the bombing: "But if you establish 83 militias in every county in the
state, who's to say that they'll all agree on what the government does? What's to prevent
another Bosnia here?" Robert Downes, On the Front Lines with Northern Michigan's Militia,
NORTHERN ExpRESS, Aug. 22, 1994, at 4. Olson's response is discussed infra note 296.
[Vol. 81:879904
THE M!L!TA MOVEMENT
Whiskey Rebellion and Shay's Rebellion. 10 9 The new rebels them-
selves claimed the mantle of 1776; in their own minds, they were hold-
ing to the faith of Washington and Jefferson by making a popular
revolution against a distant and tyrannical government. Throughout
the Republic's later history, similar groups, usually disempowered, ru-
ral and traditional, have continued to resist modernizing and central-
izing forces through violence. In defense of these rebellions, many
such groups have relied on the traditional republican belief in a right
of popular revolution." 0 Nonetheless, all of these resistance cam-
paigns met defeat, and the federal government has denied that the
groups ever had such a right to revolt. Timothy McVeigh's rebellion
thus reflects a long tradition, as does the manhunt by the FBI and the
BATF. This American dynamic suggests a certain hypocrisy: how did
a government born in revolution so quickly become intolerant of
armed resistance? How did a people born in revolution so quickly
become suspicious of revolutionary change?
Civic republicanism answers this charge of hypocrisy. Civic
republicans see a profound difference between a revolution, which is
protected by the Second Amendment, and a rebellion, which is not.
To them, a revolution is resistance to government made by the Body
of the People for the good of the whole. A rebellion, on the other
hand, is resistance by a faction for its own interests. In this sense, a
rebellion and a tyrannical government are similar; each represents an
act of aggression against the People on behalf of partial groups."'
The difference between a revolution, a rebellion, and a tyranny,
thus lies in who initiates each. The People make a revolution for the
common good; a faction makes a rebellion for its own ends; and of-
ficeholders make a tyranny for their own ends. The Second Amend-
ment protects only the first-the right of the People to make a
revolution. The People, correspondingly, have the right to keep and
bear arms. The People in this formulation, however, are not merely a
collection of factions, each with different interests. If the People were
that fragmented, popular uprising could only be multiple rebellions-
civil war, in other words. Instead, the People must have sufficient ho-
mogeneity to share a common good, so that when the government
becomes tyrannical, citizens will rise up and make a new government
together. Therefore, a Second Amendment People is not a set of ran-
dom individuals who happen to reside in the same territorial jurisdic-
109 See E. Wayne Carp, The Problem of National Defense in the Early American Republic, in
THE AMERICAN REVoLUTION: ITS CHARACTER AND LIMrrs 14, 32 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1987);
THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION 44-45, 48 (1986).
110 See, e.g., RICHARD M. BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE 4-7, 63-66 (1975) (describing the
ideological impetus for rural rebellion); SLAUGHTER, supra note 109, at 31-34, 39, 47-48, 54,
127-30.
III See Williams, supra note 18, at 582-83.
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tion. Rather, it is an organic entity, with enough commonality and
self-awareness to engage in united revolutionary action.
In the colonial and revolutionary periods, the militia was the or-
ganized manifestation of the People Armed. Eighteenth century mili-
tias were universal, and the states took pains to train members to
virtue, so that they would place the common good ahead of their own.
These two qualities-universality and virtue-were absolutely central
to the definition of the militia, and for good reason: only such a body
could be trusted with the means of violence to defend the common
good. Therefore, only the universal militia, the People itself, had the
right to stage a revolution against government." 2 As Tench Coxe ex-
plained: "THE POWERS OF THE SWORD ARE IN THE HANDS OF
THE YEOMANRY OF AMERICA FROM SIXTEEN TO SIXTY ....
Who are the militia? Are they not ourselves. Is it feared, then, that we
shall turn our arms each man against his own bosom."" 3 Similarly, Sa-
muel Adams propounded: "The militia is composed of free citizens.
There is therefore no danger of their making use of their Power to the
destruction of their own Rights, or suffering other to invade them.""14
Finally, Richard Henry Lee urged: "[T]o preserve liberty, it is essen-
tial that the whole body of the people always possess arms .... $$115
Thus, without universality or virtue, the militia would become a "se-
lect" militia or a standing army-a body that would pursue its own
aims, rather than the good of the whole." 6
In the rhetoric of the Framers, then, "the People" is a political
actor, i.e., it can act as a unit and with a will. It has a common good,
and it can recognize threats to that good. It has rights, and all of its
members have the same rights and value them in the same way. When
threatened, it will respond, and it is unwise to awaken such a giant.
Thus, in justifying the American Revolution, Jefferson described it as
an affair between peoples, not loose collections of individuals:
When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one
people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them
with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth the
separate & equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's
God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind re-
112 See id. at 577-82, 585-86.
113 APennsylvanian, PENNSYLVANIA GAZETrE, Feb. 20, 1788, reprintedin2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Microfilm Supp.) 1778-1780 (John P.
Kaminski & GasparaJ. Saladino eds., 1981).
114 3 SAMUEL ADAMS, WRITINGS 251 (Henry A. Cushing ed., 1906).
115 LEE, supra note 78, at 170.
116 SeeJOEL BARLOW, ADVICE TO THE PRIVILEGED ORDERS IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF EU-
ROPE 46 (1956); LEE, supra note 78, at 169; Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: the
Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIsr. 22, 31-32 (1984); Williams,
supra note 18, at 578.
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quires that they. should declare the causes which impel them to the
separation.1 17
Similarly, many of the states' recommendations for a Bill of
Rights reveal this organic conception of the people by asserting that
the right to arms belongs to "the Body of the People." The New York
convention, for example, delivered the following language to Con-
gress: "That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well
regulated militia, including the body of the people capable of beaing
ans, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state."" 8 Vir-
ginia's proposal was almost identical: "That the people have a right to
keep and bear arms; that a well-regulated militia, composed of the
body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe
defence of a free state."" 9 North Carolina's version followed Vir-
ginia's word-for-word. 120 In addition, the original House version of
the Second Amendment identified the militia as "the body of the peo-
ple."1 2 1 Neither the Senate version nor the amendment itself includes
that language, but in context, that omission seems stylistic, not sub-
stantive: "The Senate [version] more succinctly avoided repetition by
deleting the well-recognized definition of the militia as 'the body of
the people.""u 22
In late eighteenth-century America, "the Body of the People" was
a phrase full of meaning and significance. The leading scholar of co-
lonial resistance explains:
Under the terms of England's revolutionary tradition resistance,
like revolution, had to emerge from the "Body of the People," the
whole of political society, involving all of its social or economic sub-
divisions .... This means that more modern conceptions of revolu-
tion as class movements are inadequate for understanding the
colonists' particular political concerns .... [S]ince the people as a
whole had to contract into government, similarly the dissolution of
established authority-even in a limited sphere, such as pertained
to the Stamp Act-had to be based upon a broad popular
agreement. 12 3
Another historian explains:
117 Thomas Jefferson, A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of America, in
General Congress Assembled, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 19 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1984).
118 1 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 327-28 (2d ed. 1836).
119 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 440 (John P.
Kaminski & GasparaJ. Saladino eds., 1990).
120 See 1 ELLIOT, supra note 118, at 244.
121 See Halbrook, supra note 31, at 179.
122 Id. at 187.
123 PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION 87-88 (1972).
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The close tie between the nascent idea of popular sovereignty and
revolutionary events appears in Boston. G.B. Warden has written
that "the growing unity" in revolutionary Boston "among... various
groups" was connected to an "entity called the 'Body of the Peo-
ple.' " Patriots and their opponents all came to use the term "Body
of the People" as a synonym for "a majority of the people" or the
"greater part of the people." Soon the "Body of the People" re-
ferred to "the united will of the people" in symbolic substitution for
"the Crown," and both legal and extralegal gatherings alike were
characterized as the "Body of the People." In 1773 it was a meeting
of the "Body"-justified as "representing all the people in the prov-
ince"-that led to the Boston Tea Party.' 24
Jonathan Mayhew expressed the idea most vividly: the citizenry may
make a revolution only when "the whole Body of the People ... unite
and determine as one Man."' 25
Thus, when the Framers discussed revolution, they imagined the
People acting as a body, an organic entity with a single will. One
searches in vain through their writings for any recognition that Ameri-
can citizens might: 1) have systematically different perceptions of em-
pirical reality; 2) have systematically different values or interests; and
3) have systematically different conceptions of justice and the social
contract, so that a unified future revolution might be problematic.
Indeed, the Framers' theory of revolution ostensibly had only one way
to deal with difference among citizens: treat it as a deviation from the
norm of peoplehood by ostracizing the dissenters. That tendency is
most evident in the military response to Shay's Rebellion and the
Whiskey Rebellion, but it actually began with the exile and suppres-
sion of loyalists during the Revolutionary War.126 Rebels, loyalists, and
tyrants were all hypothesi aberrant groups, outsiders acting against the
interests of the People, not Americans with different views of the
world. 127
The Second Amendment, in other words, conjures with the idea
of a People: it simply presumes that a People exists, because that pre-
sumption is necessary for the provision to make sense in its own terms.
It does not, however, seriously examine whether a People actually
124 BROWN, supra note 110, at 61-62 (citations omitted).
125 MAIER, supra note 123, at 64 (citation omitted).
126 See, e.g., Robert M. Calhoon, The Reintegration of the Loyalists and the Disaffected, in
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER AND LIMrrs, supra note 109, at 51; EDWARD
CoUNTRYMAN, A PEOPLE IN REVOLUTION 170-75, 186, 214-15, 235-36, 284-85 (1981).
127 In this sense, the theory of the existence of a body of the people never presupposed
absolute unanimity among the citizenry. Rather, it assumed that the bulk of the people
formed a core group that could act on shared values and customs, outside of the normal
channels of political authority. Dissenters from this core could not be part of the revolu-
tionary movement. As this Article will argue, there is good reason to wonder whether the
bulk of the modem American citizenry still form such a revolutionary core.
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does exist in America. Given the ideological conflicts at the time of
the founding, that silence is not entirely surprising. Some political
thinkers of that time recognized that the American people were divid-
ing into what we would today call interest groups. These thinkers in-
sisted that any political order must acknowledge the existence of
factionalism and seek to control its effects, rather than to eliminate
the phenomenon. 12 8 Civic republicanism, by contrast, nostalgically
maintained that a just government was possible only if the people
were sufficiently homogeneous to possess a common good. As a re-
sult, republicanism feared specialization, because specialized citizens
would have separate and rival interests; the conflict of those interests
would transform politics from the disinterested search for the public
good into a selfish pursuit of individual appetite. One form of special-
ization was a standing army, but the greatest threat came from the
developing market economy: if citizens have different economic con-
cerns, then the regulation of the economy can be nothing more than
a struggle for individual advantage. 129 The possibility of a republic, in
other words, depended on the existence of a People, which civic
republicans were resolved to create or preserve.' 30 For that reason,
civic republicans had to conjure with the concept of a People, because
it occupied a critical place in their political analysis and program. If
there were no People, there could be no common good, only interest-
group politics. If there were no People, there could also be no revolu-
tion, only rebellions and civil war.
B. Conjuring with the People
At the level of formal analysis, few modern theorists of the Sec-
ond Amendment have acknowledged that the Second Amendment
right to revolution depends on the existence of a People. States'
rights theorists argue that the right to bear arms belongs only to the
National Guard as the modern successors of the state militias. The
National Guard, however, is not a revolutionary People, because it is
not universal and exhibits some of the characteristics of a distinct in-
terest group.' 3 ' Individual rights theorists, by contrast, argue that the
people possess a right to own arms so as to make a revolution or at
least to mount resistance to an oppressive government. 132 Indeed, a
128 See, e.g., BANNING, supra note 21, at 97-102; Pococr, supra note 20, at 517-21; WOOD,
supra note 8, at 544-47; Williams, supra note 18, at 569-71. See generally ISAAC KRAMNICK,
REPUBuCANISM AND BOURGEOIS RADICAuISM (1990). Madison's Federalist 10 is the locus das-
sicus of this approach. THE FEDERALSr No. 10 (James Madison).
129 See supra text accompanying note 108; Williams, supra note 18, at 568-69.
130 See Williams, supra note 18, at 564-65.
131 See supra text accompanying note 89.
132 See, e.g., Kates, supra note 31, at 267-68; Levinson, supra note 31, at 646-51; Lund,
supra note 31, at 111-16.
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central part of their case rests on the fact that the text of the amend-
ment refers to the "right of the people to keep and bear arms."133 In
referring to the right of the people, however, these theorists mean
that individual American citizens who happen to own guns may make
a revolution. They emphatically do not mean that only as a collectivity
do the American People possess a right to make a revolution; indeed,
they are quick to deny that the amendment protects collective
rights. 34 As a result, they never examine whether Americans consti-
tute a unified people, because that question is irrelevant to their inter-
pretation of the provision. Consequently, these theorists are not
concerned that, like the National Guard, individual gun-owners do
not make a people because they are not universal, have not been
trained to virtue, and are demographically skewed.
The militia movement also fails to recognize the necessity of a
revolutionary People for a right to revolution. Like individual rights
theorists, militia writers stress that the Amendment protects the right
of "the people" and that the militia of the 1780s included all Ameri-
can citizens--'john Q. Public." 3 5 Militia writers conclude that the
right to revolution belongs to private militias composed of random
volunteers. A collection of private militias, however, does not com-
prise a universal militia any more than a collection of private gun-
owners do, because they are not universal, have not been trained to
virtue, and are demographically skewed.' 3 6 As many observers have
suggested, the militia draws its membership from groups of people
who feel unjustly disempowered by recent events, including angry
white males, conservative Christians, and rural residents.'3 7 Militias
prepare for revolution when they feel neglected by the electoral pro-
cess, and they dream of a time when people like them will again have
power and receive their rightful due. That story, however, is a fantasy
of rebellion rooted in the interests of a social faction, not of revolu-
tion by the People as a whole.
This failure to recognize the dependence of a right to revolution
on the existence of a People creates analytical and practical problems
for modern theorists of the Second Amendment. States' rights theo-
rists ignore the problems: because in their view the right to arms be-
longs only to the Guard, the constitution of a revolutionary people is
irrelevant. For individual rights theorists and militia writers, however,
the problem is more pressing, because they believe that the mass of
private individuals has the right to make a revolution against govern-
133 See, e.g., HALBROOK, supra note 53, at 84-87; Kates, supra note 31, at 218; Van Al-
styne, supra note 31, at 1236-37.
134 See, e.g., Kates, supra note 31, at 223-25.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 113-22.
136 See infra text accompanying notes 155-62.
137 See infra text accompanying notes 259-61.
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ment. That analysis raises troubling questions: How will this revolu-
tion, made by large numbers of private individuals or groups, work?
When is a revolution warranted? Who should lead it? And how will
there be agreement on those issues? In short, how shall we act as a
People? Can we act as a People?
As explained above, at the level of explicit analysis, theorists in
the militia movement and individual rights school largely ignore these
questions. However, they seem troubled by the questions, because
close inspection of their writing reveals an implicit, very different atti-
tude toward the existence of a People: at the level of rhetoric, like the
Framers before them, such writers respond by conjuring with the Peo-
ple. They argue that as the People have the right to arms, the People
will decide when and how to act. That argument, however, presup-
poses (and implicitly asserts by presupposing) that American citizens
constitute a People. It assumes that, revolting spontaneously and in-
dependently, all of the individuals and groups in America will act as a
body. Virtually no militia writers or individual rights theorists con-
front the alternative scenario that a unified revolution is virtually im-
possible today and that civil war is a more likely result.' 38
1. Individual Rights Theorists
This Part will illustrate the claim that individual rights theorists
conjure with the People by analyzing three significant articles in that
school of thought. 39 In his very thoughtful and influential The Embar-
138 See infra text accompanying notes 182-90. As this Article notes below, see infra text
accompanying notes 151-54, Don Kites recognizes the possibility of civil war, but he fails to
recognize the significance of that fact.
139 The selection of these articles was based on their scholarly excellence, even though
this author disagrees with parts of their analysis. These pieces, in other words, represent
the individual rights view at its best, yet they still conjure with the People. One could amass
similar conjurings in many other articles, but that task would be more tedious than useful.
Only Akhil R. Amar has seriously addressed how historical changes in the relationship
of the individual to the People might affect the meaning of the Second Amendment. In
his view, most of the original Bill of Rights were political (popular), not individual (civil),
rights; they were designed to allow the people to express its will. By contrast, the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment, through which the right to arms may be incorporated
against the states, were primarily concerned about individual rights. Akhil R. Amar, The
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 1193, 1262-66 (1992). Although he
does not offer a precise explanation of the modem meaning of the right to arms under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Amar plainly believes that it differs from the original right to
arms under the Second Amendment:
[T]he core applications and central meanings of the right to keep and bear
arms and other key rights were very different in 1866 than in 1789....
[W]hen we 'apply' the Bill of Rights against the states today, we must first
and foremost reflect on the meaning and the spirit of the Amendment of
1866, not the Bill of 1789.
Id. at 1266. Because the popular right to revolution does not translate very well into an
individual right, Amar presumably believes that it does not apply to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment at all. Regrettably, however, Amar does not address the modem
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rassing Second Amendment,' 40 Sanford Levinson rejects the view that
"the substantive right [to arms] is one pertaining to a collective
body-'the people'-rather than to individuals."141 In republican
thought, according to Levinson, individuals have the right to engage
in armed resistance against the government: "Consider the possibility,
though, that the ultimate 'checking value' in a republican polity is the
ability of an armed populace, presumptively motivated by a shared
commitment to the common good, to resist governmental tyranny." 142
At this point, however, Levinson has already begun to conjure with
the people, or, rather, to repeat the Framers' conjuring: he assumes
that the armed populace is "presumptively motivated by a shared com-
mitment to the common good."
Is the populace actually so motivated, so that it constitutes a Peo-
ple? Levinson apparently believes so, because he argues that the revo-
lutionary Second Amendment has important contemporary relevance:
[I] t seems foolhardy to assume that the armed state will necessarily
be benevolent .... The development of widespread suffrage and
greater majoritarianism in our polity is itself no sure protection, at
least within republican theory. The republican theory is predicated
on the stark contrast between mere democracy, where people are
motivated by selfish personal interest, and a republic, where civic
virtue, both in citizens and leadership, tames selfishness on behalf
of the common good.143
In short, the people have a right to bear arms because they share a
commitment to the common good and will presumptively act only on
that commitment. It would be unwise, however, to blithely accept that
scenario as a description of modern reality. The Framers hoped to
achieve commitment to a common good through membership in a
universal militia and the preservation of homogeneity. Because those
conditions no longer exist, one must wonder what the common good
could be under conditions of radical diversity and whether citizens are
committed to that common good.
meaning of the Second Amendment itself, so it is unclear whether he believes that the
American citizenry still has a right of revolution against the federal government.
140 See Levinson, supra note 31. This Article is probably responsible for much of the
recent scholarly interest in the Second Amendment, the so-called "Second Amendment
Renaissance." It has influenced political commentators, see, e.g., George F. Will, America's
Crisis of Gunfire, WASH. Posr, Mar. 21, 1991, at A21, politicians, and even popular novelists;
see STEPHEN HUNTER, POINT OF IMPACr 9 (1993). It is, in short, a central document in
modern individual rights theory.
141 Levinson, supra note 31, at 645.
142 Id. at 648 (citing Lund, supra note 31, at 111-16).
143 Id. at 656.
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Nelson Lund, too, conjures with the People.'4 Like Levinson, he
believes that the right to bear arms is individual: "The language of the
Second Amendment protects an individual's right to keep and bear
arms."' 45 But then he continues: "The language also indicates, how-
ever, that this private right is protected for the sake of a public
good .... The primary purpose of the people's right to keep and bear
arms... is to allow them to act as a credible counterweight to the gov-
ernment's military forces."' 46 Lund here conjures with the People to
explain how the right to revolution will work: in the first sentence, he
describes the right as "an individual's," but by the second sentence
those individuals have somehow unified into a "people" (he calls them
"the people") to counterweight the armed services. The conjured im-
age contains two simple elements: the government as a mass on one
side, and the People as a bloc on the other.
Lund is, however, aware that Americans do not constitute a single
bloc and that civil war seems more likely than revolution. Perhaps for
that reason, his analysis at this point becomes somewhat ambivalent,
as he both welcomes and fears a right of revolution. On the one
hand, he argues that government oppression remains a possibility in
this country so that citizens must retain the right to resistance. 47 On
the other hand, Lund would not allow private citizens to maintain "a
stock of armaments and expertise sufficient to defeat either the armed
forces of the United States, or even a state's National Guard, in bat-
tle."' 48 Any attempt to arm the citizenry in this manner would be "im-
possible" and "foolhardy," but, more importantly, the Constitution
gives the federal government the power to "suppress Insurrections." 49
In the end, the only point in the revolutionary Second Amendment
for Lund is its psychological impact on the government: our gover-
nors will hesitate long before assaulting a (lightly) armed citizenry be-
cause "[a]ny use of military force ... depends upon a calculation of
both the benefits and the costs of its use.... [A] ny factor increasing
the anticipated cost of a military operation makes the conduct of that
operation incrementally more unlikely."' 50 In other words, the likeli-
hood of government oppression is reduced to the extent that the pop-
144 See Lund, supra note 31. Like Levinson's and Kates's articles, this article has at-
tracted widespread, respectful attention from other individual rights theorists, perhaps be-
cause it is uncommonly intellectually sophisticated and careful. Unfortunately, most
writers have ignored what may be the most interesting and original part of the piece: a
proposal to control gun ownership through mandatory insurance requirements. Id. at 127-
30.
145 Md. at I111.
146 Id. at 111, 113-14.
147 Id. at 116.
148 Id. at 115.
1,49 Id.
150 Ad.
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ulation is armed. Thus, having praised a popular right to revolution,
Lund then drastically curtails it: the People may resist but not win,
and the government may oppress but must pay the cost.
Lund might be driven to this equivocation because of his ambiva-
lent attitudes toward the American citizenry. He is tempted to con-
jure with the People, but he also feels a sensible discomfort with that
temptation. On the one hand, in defending the right to bear arnis, he
assumes that Americans are a united people that must have arms in
order to resist the government. No sooner has he made that case,
however, than he realizes that some private individuals might use the
right to resist for selfish ends. As a result, he quickly affirms the gov-
emment's right to put down rebellions and dramatically limits the citi-
zenry's right to arms. By the end, without the image of a united
revolutionary people before him, Lund has virtually dismantled the
right to revolution.
In contrast, Don Kates acknowledges the likelihood of civil war in
the event of armed resistance, but fails to understand the constitu-
tional significance of that probability. In his pathbreaking work Hand-
gun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 51
Kates maintains: "The second amendment's language and historical
and philosophical background demonstrate that it was designed to
guarantee individuals the possession of certain kinds of arms for three
purposes: (1) crime prevention... (2) national defense... (3) pres-
ervation of individual liberty and popular institutions against domestic
despotism."152 He advocates the continued importance of this third
purpose, even in the face of new arms technology. Kates rejects the
argument that "an armed citizenry cannot hope to overthrow a mod-
em military machine" because it is wrong to assume "that a handgun-
armed citizenry will eschew [effective] guerrilla tactics in favor of
[ineffectively] throwing themselves headlong under the tracks of ad-
vancing tanks."153 At this point, Kates has begun to conjure with the
People: he speaks of the citizenry as a united body choosing whether
and how to resist.
Kates continues his analysis with an uncommonly realistic
description:
[T]he issue is not really overthrowing a tyranny but deterring its institu-
tion in the first place. To persuade his officers and men to support
a coup, a potential military despot must convince them that his rule
151 See Kates, supra note 31, at 268. Like Levinson's, Kates's article is a seminal piece in
the development of the individual rights theory. For many years, it was the only article on
the Second Amendment published in a "top-ten" law review; its documentation is prodig-
ious; and it has been very widely cited.
152 Id. at 267-68.
153 Id. at 270.
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will succeed where our current civilian leadership and policies are
failing. In a country whose widely divergent citizenry possesses
upwards of 160 million firearms, however, the most likely outcome
of usurpation (no matter how initially successful) is not benevolent
dictatorship, but prolonged, internecine civil war. 54
One might read this passage in one of two ways. First, Kates's pro-
jected scenario might be that the "widely divergent people" unite to-
gether with their "160 million firearms" to resist a usurper. In that
situation and only in that situation, the people have the right to resist.
No usurper in his right mind, however, would risk such resistance.
Therefore, deterrence by a united people will always be successful. In
this reading, Kates is still conjuring with the People: if the population
really is so "widely divergent," it seems unlikely that American citizens
would ever agree that a given President is in fact a tyrant-or at least,
so Oklahoma City would suggest.
Alternatively, Kates may believe that the people will not unite,
and armed resistance will result not in revolution but in vicious do-
mestic infighting. Despite that prediction, however, he still believes
that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to arms, apparently
on the grounds that the amendment protects a right to conduct "pro-
longed, internecine civil war." As argued above, I believe that the
Framers would disagree: the Second Amendment guarantees the
right of the Body of the People to make a united revolution for the
common good, not the right of factions to make a rebellion.
2. Militia Writers
Similarly, militia writers conjure with the People in describing
how armed resistance by private groups will result in unified revolu-
tion: like the individual rights theorists, they just assume that such a
People exists and owns arms. Militia writers also make a second and
perhaps more important claim: they insist that the militia movement
represents the People and that the federal government stands in op-
position to the People. The Militia News summarizes this view: "THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS DECLARED OPEN WARFARE ON THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE." 55 Federal Lands Update asks, "Who are the in-
dividuals and organizations that continually demand and insist that
you do certain things which run contrary to; [sic] not only your beliefs
and convictions, but to the convictions of the vast majority of the citizens.
Our old friends; [sic] the federal government, of course.' 56 In time
of crisis, "the militias will be the main defense against tyranny. At this
present time, the people are warning federal government; [sic] let us
154 Id. at 270-71.
155 Grady, supra note 39, at 3.
156 Faulkner, supra note 68, at 4 (emphasis added).
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alone or face the consequences." 57 Samuel Sherwood demands: "We
must look at the reality of the situation and say, who is master, and
who is the slave. Who is the servant, and who is the sovereign. In
America, the people are the sovereign, then why are we subject to
slave laws [i.e. gun control laws] with which we do not agree." 158 The
Militia of Montana adds to the refrain:
[W]hen the codes and statutes are unjust for the majority of the
people, the people will rightly revolt, and the government will have
to acquiesce without a shot being fired, because the militia stands
vigilant in carrying out the will of the people in defense of rights,
liberty and freedom. 159
These passages contain the elements of a powerful myth. In the
place of a nation of contentious and disunified individuals, most of
whom disagree with the militia's substantive views, the militias envi-
sion the People, or at least the "vast majority of the people," arrayed in
militant unity against a tyrannical government. Most importantly,
"the people" allegedly agree with the militia writer's substantive views,
whatever they happen to be, so that the government must "let us
alone or face the consequences." The apotheosis of this style of analy-
sis is the common militia condemnation of officeholders as traitors.
For example, the North American Volunteer Militia sent out letters
that warn:
Each of you have [sic] taken an Oath to uphold the Constitution for
the United States. The Oath is your contract with the people.
When you violate your Oath of office you become renegade to the
Constitution and guilty of treason. I am sure you know what the
penalty is for treason. 60
Linda Thompson issued an "Ultimatum" to each member of Congress
demanding the repeal of the Brady Bill and the Fourteenth, Six-
teenth, and Seventeenth Amendments, as well as a declaration that
Congress has no criminal jurisdiction on the "soil of any sovereign
state."' 6 ' The document concludes: "If you do not personally and
publicly attend to these demands, you will be identified as a Traitor,
and you will be brought up on charges for Treason before a Court of
the Citizens of this Country."162
The allegations of treason in these passages depend on the rhe-
torical supposition of a united people. On this view, America is not a
157 Id.
158 UNrTD STATES MILIA Assoc., OFFICIAL POLICY AND ANNOUNCEMENT, MEMBER BE-
HAVIOR TowARD LAw ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL 7 (1995) [USMA pamphlet].
159 THE Mm7A, supra note 34, at 8.
160 See, e.g., Letter from North American Volunteer Militia toJudgeJeffLangton (Dec.
30, 1994) (copy on file with the author).
161 Ultimatum by Linda Thompson (April 19, 1994) (on file with the author).
162 Id.
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place of rival, discordant factions, each of which sends leaders to Con-
gress, where the squabbling-unseemy but legitimate-continues.
Instead, there is a single American People that embraces, and is de-
fined by, the political views of the militia groups. Politicians who disa-
gree with those views are therefore not loyal Americans, representing
other loyal American citizens; they are instead traitors to the People,
scheming Others in a land of consensus.
3. Commonality Between Militia Writers and Individual
Rights Theorists
The foregoing analysis argues that militia writers and individual
rights theorists agree on certain propositions. Following the
Oklahoma City tragedy, there has been so much finger-pointing 163
that it is important to be clear about where this commonality exists
between the two groups and where it does not. Most importantly, in
my view, individual rights theorists are in no sense responsible for the
militia movement, nor do I believe that they are sympathetic to it.
Every individual rights theorist that I know is a responsible, serious
scholar. They do not believe that the federal government is tyranni-
cal, nor do they share the militia's extreme political values, nor do
they believe that violence is an appropriate response to political disa-
greement. They have not given aid and comfort, aided and abetted,
or encouraged the movement.
Nonetheless, they share two important ideas with the militia writ-
ers. First, individuals have a right to own arms to make a revolution.
Second, the people, meaning the totality of private citizens, will de-
cide when and where a revolution is warranted. As a result, given the
structure of the argument, individual rights theorists may reject
Timothy McVeigh's particular actions, but they cannot categorically
reject the class of such actions. The militia movement is wrong, in
other words, not because it believes that private individuals have a
right to mount a revolution, but because it believes that present cir-
cumstances justify such a revolution. In the end, however, the peo-
ple-meaning the mass of private individuals like Timothy McVeigh,
Samuel Sherwood, Linda Thompson, Pat Buchanan, Bill Clinton,
Jesse Jackson, David Williams, and each reader of this Article-must
decide when the time is right. In this sense, individual rights theorists
might disagree with the militia writers on their application of the pri-
vate right to revolution, but not on the existence of the right itself.
Or so it would seem. As suggested above, individual rights theo-
rists have been quite vague about the actual mechanics of any pro-
163 Rush Limbaugh felt so vulnerable to criticism that he wrote an editorial for a major
magazine arguing that he is not to blame for the bombing. Rush Limbaugh, Blame the
Bombers-Only, NawswEEs, May 8, 1995, at 39.
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jected revolution; they simply assert that when the time comes, the
People will act. That assertion hides all of the important questions by
conjuring with the People, but the bombing in Oklahoma City forces
those questions into the open. As a result, in the months to come,
individual rights theorists may clarify their earlier writing by qualifying
the right to own arms to make a revolution. It remains to be seen,
after all of the qualification gets done, how much remains of that
right.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds's recent work offers an illustration. That
work is important for two reasons: he is the earliest individual rights
theorist to discuss the militia movement; and among those theorists,
his writing is particularly thoughtful, probing, and balanced. For all
of those considerable virtues, however, his work also illustrates the dif-
ficulties facing the individual rights position after the Oklahoma City
bombing.
Reynolds is solidly in the individual rights camp. He endorses
what he calls the "'Standard Model' of Second Amendment interpre-
tation,"164 the view that the Amendment guarantees "an individual
right to keep and bear arms."1 65 The purpose of that right is to place
"a check on government tyranny and on the power of a standing
army."166 Like other individual rights theorists, he argues that the
"well-regulated militia" refers to the entire citizenry, and he pointedly
rejects the idea that the purpose of the Amendment was to guarantee
the states' right to maintain militias, rather than the people's right to
own arms. 167
Reynolds argues that the Second Amendment not only guaran-
teed an individual right to arms in 1792, but continues to guarantee
such a right today, despite the absence of a universal militia. In his
sensitive discussion of my own earlier work, Reynolds concedes that
the Second Amendment might have presupposed a universal militia,
but he responds that "there is a solution to that problem, too: If gun
ownership is essential to give the Second Amendment meaning, then
simply require everyone to own a gun (and to go through the neces-
sary training to use it responsibly)."168 He adds that he does not actu-
ally recommend the creation of such a body, he merely believes that it
would answer my argument. 169 That response, however, does not ac-
tually clear up the problem. First, arming the populace is not the
same as recreating a universal militia. The universal militia was raised
164 Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REv. 461,
464 (1995).
165 Id. at 466.
166 Id. at 467.
167 See id. at 472-74.
168 Id. at 487.
169 See id. at 488.
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and trained by the state to virtue, and it rested on the commonality of
peoplehood; general private arms-possession will not recreate those
conditions. Second, as Reynolds recognizes,' 70 the universal militia is
a "condition precedent" for the Amendment. If a universal militia
exists, the Amendment might have its original meaning. If it does
not, it cannot. As a result, if Reynolds believes in a modem constitu-
tional right to bear arms, he must also believe in a modem universal
militia; he cannot be indifferent to the idea, as he claims to be.
Nonetheless, Reynolds concludes that the Amendment presently
protects an individual right to arms. Even at the time of his writing
this article (before the bombing), however, Reynolds was concerned
about the militia movement "[T]here are news reports that large
numbers of Americans . . . have organized themselves into militia
companies whose stated purpose is to resist a tyrannical govern-
ment"' 71 At this point in his analysis, Reynolds apparently believes
that the militia movement is incorrect, not for believing that private
individuals have a right to band together to make a revolution, but for
believing that the time for revolution is now. He perceptively points
out that the individual rights theory is distressingly vague about the
grounds for revolution:
Standard Model scholars have paid almost no attention to the ques-
tion of when such a revolt would be justified.... If we have the right
to keep and bear arms in no small part so that, in the last resort, we
can rise up and overthrow a tyrannical government, then one im-
portant aspect of the right would seem to be some basis for agreeing
on whether the government is tyrannical or not. 172
According to Reynolds, individual rights theorists must remedy that
deficiency in order to counter the militia movement's analysis:
Many of these inaividuals are very familiar with the Second Amend-
ment, and with Standard Model scholarship, but most are sadly lack-
ing in understanding about what the Framers would have
considered a tyrannical government .... But without a proper
grounding in this subject, there are twin risks. One is that some
citizens will think it time to revolt when it is not ... The other
(perhaps less likely in light of that streak of anarchy that seems part
of our American culture) is that many citizens will not think that it
is time to revolt when it is. 173
To this stage in his article, Reynolds has analyzed the militia the-
ory of the amendment as this Article has suggested an individual
rights theorist would before the bombing: the militias are right in
170 Id. at 485-86.
171 Id. at 506.
172 Id. at 505-06.
173 Id. at 506.
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thinking that "we"-i.e. private American citizens outside of a univer-
sal militia-have a right to revolt against a tyrannical government, but
wrong in thinking that present conditions justify such a revolt. So
"we" need to talk about what would justify a revolution; otherwise,
some citizens will revolt too early and some too late. 174 Hence, the
dynamic of Reynolds's proposed revolution follows the decentralized
model of the individual rights theorist: we individuals have a right to
revolt, but we need to consult each other to ensure that the revolution
occurs at the right time. There is no mention of the necessity of a
universal militia, a People, or a common good.
The Oklahoma City bombing occurred after Reynolds completed
his original article but before it went to press. To consider the signifi-
cance of that event, Reynolds wrote an Addendum with a different
focus. 175 Although he still rejects the demands of the militia move-
ment for an imminent revolution, he does so on a different and more
fundamental basis. The problem is not just that the militia movement
thinks that the present government is tyrannical when it is not; the
problem is that only the Body of the People may stage a revolution.
Quoting my earlier work, he explains: "Republicans did not intend to
leave the universality of the militia to the chance decision of every
citizen to arm herself. The state was supposed to erect the necessary
scaffolding on which the militia could build itself, to muster the mili-
tia, and oblige every citizen to own a gun."176 Later, relying on the
same article, he distinguishes between a revolution and a rebellion: a
revolution "must be a product of the 'body' of the people, i.e., the
great majority acting by consensus; it must be a course of last resort; its
inspiration must be a commitment to the common good; and its ob-
ject must be a true tyrant, committed to large-scale abuse." 177
After reflecting on the significance of Oklahoma City, Professor
Reynolds seems to have further restricted the conditions under which
a Second Amendment revolution may occur: only a body (such as the
universal militia) committed to the common good and comprising a
People may make such a revolution. If, however, Professor Reynolds
accepts that analysis, then he must also agree that if there is no such
174 Professor Reynolds offers one principal limit resistance to an electoral government
is definitionally illegitimate because recourse in a democracy must be to the ballot box, not
the bullet box. Cf. Reynolds, supra note 164, at 507; Glenn H. Reynolds, Up in Arms About a
Revolting Movement CHI. Tiu., Jan. 30, 1995, at NI1. (To protect Professor Reynolds's good
name, it is important to add that the atrocious "revolting movement" pun was his editors'
idea, not his. See Reynolds, supra note 164, at 506 n.212.) One wonders whether he in-
tends this limit to be absolute. If so, other individual rights theorists would disagree with
him. Sanford Levinson, for example, argues that even elected governments can engage in
such tyrannous acts as to justify revolution. See Levinson, supra note 31, at 657.
175 Reynolds, supra note 164, at 508-12.
176 Id. at 509 (quoting Williams, supra note 18, at 593).
177 Id. at 510 (quoting Williams, supra note 18, at 582).
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body, then there is no right to revolution. And if there is no right to
revolution, then there can be no right to bear arms to stage a revolu-
tion. The historical, revolutionary Second Amendment cannot have
any contemporary meaning if it presupposes historical conditions that
have disappeared. 178
In short, Professor Reynolds's work illustrates the challenge that
the militia movement offers the individual rights position. 179 He be-
gins his analysis with a strong assertion of the private right to arms to
check the government, but by the end he has tied the fulfillment of
the right to a body (the universal militia, the Body of the People) that
arguably no longer exists. Even before the bombing, Reynolds was
presciently concerned about the militia. Among individual rights the-
orists, he alone recognized the need for standards to measure the le-
gitimacy of particular revolutions. 80 Following the bombing, perhaps
other scholars will attempt to explain why the individual rights theory
does not really sanction an individual right to take up arms against the
government. After that writing, it remains to be seen how much will
remain of the individual right to own arms as a checking function on
government. 181 Under this Article's thesis, in the absence of a univer-
178 See Williams, supra note 18, at 588-96.
179 Unfortunately, Reynolds argues that the states' rights theory is to blame for the
militia movement:
[S]ome gun-control proponents have promulgated the notion that the Sec-
ond Amendment protects only a militia; many pro-gun activists have re-
sponded by forming militias in the hopes that doing so would somehow
expand their constitutional rights .... Be careful what you advocate in
terms of constitutional principles, because people may listen to you.
Reynolds, supra note 164, at 511.
That claim, however, is plainly mistaken. The militia movement has not "responded"
to any Second Amendment scholarship, properly interpreted, and scholars cannot be re-
sponsible for the willful distortion of their scholarship by political movements. In addition,
militia members share at least as much philosophical ground with the individual rights
theory as with the states' rights theory. Like states' rights theorists, militia members believe
that it is important to organize into militias, and that organization may make them more
dangerous. They would not be dangerous at all, however, if they did not believe in a pri-
vate right to own arms to make a revolution, a position that they share with the individual
rights theorists.
180 Id. at 504-07.
181 There is one argument available to individual rights theory. On the one hand, only
a formal state militia may make a revolution, but on the other hand, there exists a universal
right to own private arms so that the states will have an armed populace from which to
summon their militia. Indeed, in seeking to reconcile the introductory clause of the
Amendment (about the importance of a militia) with the main clause (about the right of
the people), some scholars have already suggested that one purpose of the provision is to
ensure an armed citizenry as a foundation for state militias:
[O]ne purpose of the Founders having been to guarantee the arms of the
militia, they accomplished that purpose by guaranteeing the arms of the
individuals who made up the militia.... [B]elieving that a militia (com-
posed of the entire people possessed of their individually owned arms) was
necessary for the protection of a free state, they guaranteed the people's
right to possess those arms.
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sal militia or some other basis for Peoplehood, virtually- nothing can
remain of the right.
C. A Twentieth Century American People?
The Framers identified the universal militia with the People, not
with the National Guard, individual gun-owners, or private groups.
No one can win the debate among individual rights theorists, states'
rights theorists, and militia writers, because all sides in that debate are
trying to draw precise historical parallels where none exists. The only
modern analogue for a universal militia would be some other manifes-
tation of revolutionary Peoplehood. To determine whether such an
analogue exists, one must look seriously at modern America. It is no
longer wise to assume that Americans constitute a united People with
a right to revolution; the Oklahoma City bombing is sufficient evi-
dence, if any were needed, of the foolishness of that proposition. Any
revolutionary theory of the Second Amendment must therefore an-
swer the question: who comprise the Body of the People that could
make a revolution? The eighteenth century offered an institutional
answer: the People are the universal militia, raised by the 'state and
trained to be virtuous. Whether that answer was satisfactory at the
time, it will no longer serve, because America no longer has a univer-
sal militia or even a dim prospect of one. So to preserve a revolution-
ary Second Amendment, it is necessary to find a People somewhere
else.
That task is daunting in light of the changes in American society
over the last two hundred years. Even in 1776, the People might not
have been unified; Americans disagreed viciously over the wisdom of
the War for Independence itself, that great icon of American unity.18 2
Kates, supra note 31, at 217-18; see also Reynolds, supra note 164, at 472-73; Van Alstyne,
supra note 31, at 1243-44.
From an individual rights perspective, however, this path is treacherous. First, most
individual rights theorists might accept the idea that one purpose of the Amendment was
to ensure an armed citizenry to make up the militia. They would emphatically deny, how-
ever, that only a formally organized militia has the right to revolution. SeeKates, supra note
31, at 217-18. Even in the passage above, Kates identifies the militia with "the entire people
possessed of their individually owned arms." Id. From the point of view of these theorists,
there is good reason for this denial. If the state declines to raise a militia, the people
(private American citizens) have no right to revolution. If the state systematically abjures
reliance on a militia, there would appear to be no need for an armed populace to supply
the militia, thus eliminating the private right to arms. Finally, if the Amendment is to
provide a population base for state militias, it would appear to be a protection for the states,
not individuals. States could choose to disband the militia and disarm the citizenry if they
so chose; or they could choose to keep the militia, arm them at public expense, and disarm
everyone else. Only the federal government would be barred from disarming the general
population, because that would interfere with the states' right to raise its militia from an
armed populace, if they should see fit. Such a position seems to have more in common
with the states' rights theory than the individual rights theory.
182 See Calhoon, supra note 126, at 59-62.
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If Americans were, ever.a.People, however, there is reason to doubt
that they remain one today. This country has expanded the voting
citizenry to include women, 183 persons of color, 8 4 and propertyless
men. Massive immigration has brought values, cultures, languages,
and religions that have enriched the country but also made it less ho-
mogenous.18 5 The social world, especially the economy, has become
more complex, bringing with it great specialization, just as the repub-
licans feared.18 6 In the popular imagination' 8 7 and some schools of
political science, 88 politics has become simply the pursuit of advan-
tage by interest groups. Finally, to an extent unimagined in the 1780s,
Americans have embraced the central tenet of mainstream liberalism:
the individual has the right to chart his own life-course, free of com-
munity pressure to conform to a communal identity that might form
the basis for peoplehood. 8 9
These difficulties might not definitely prove that no American
People exists, but they certainly demonstrate that it is a serious ques-
tion whether any such People can possibly exist. Accordingly, any
complete theory of Second Amendment revolution must offer a care-
ful explanation of how, despite the diversity of the United States, the
citizenry can constitute itself as a People in the moment of revolu-
tion. 90 Unfortunately, neither the individual rights theory nor the
183 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
184 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
185 See, e.g., JOHN HirHia, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIISM,
1860-1925 (1988); KENNETH L KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989).
186 See, e.g., THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE AGE OF CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION: ESSAYS IN
THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF RURAL AMERICA (Steven Hahn &Jonathan Prude eds., 1985).
187 See EJ. DioNNEJR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS (1991).
188 SeeJAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT. LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theory of Eco-
nomi Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCi. 3 (1971).
189 See Williams & Williams, supra note 47, at 776-89, 880-81.
190 Perhaps the most plausible explanation might run along the following lines: there
does not exist a people now, and under normal circumstances they never may become one.
Nonetheless, in the event of true, severe, and large-scale oppression, a people might
emerge, rallying together to drive off the tyrant This argument has the advantage of at
least being an explanation of how a people might arise; it does not, in other words, merely
conjure with the concept of a people. It suffers, however, from at least two important
problems. First, without more analysis, it is entirely speculative; the people might come
together under provocation, but they might not. As the next Part will suggest, under pres-
ent circumstances, there is reason to believe that citizens will not all perceive, evaluate, or
respond to a crisis of oppression in the same way. See infra part I1. Second, this explana-
tion of self-constitution is at least somewhat inconsistent with the Framers' theory of self-
constitution. The Framers believed that the American people already were a people, com-
mitted to the common good, unified, and organized in the militia. See Williams, supra note
18, at 569, 577-85. As a result, they could reliably predict that a right of revolution would
actually result in revolution, rather than endemic civil war. That prediction was part of
their larger belief that republican measures, like a right of revolution, were appropriate for
a republican citizenry, but might be inappropriate for an alienated, atomistic, and self-
interested citizenry. See id. at 564-65, 605.
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states' right theory offers such an explanation. Instead, the latter de-
nies that the amendment gives a right of revolution to the people; the
former recognizes such a right but merely conjures with the concept
of the People.
III
THEME AND VARIATIONS-MILITIA VISIONS OF THE PEOPLE
The militia movement, on the other hand, does not just conjure
with the People; it also offers some more specific explanations of the
basis of peoplehood. All of these explanations concur on some basic
propositions, a central theme. First, there is an American People, uni-
fied in all important ways and represented by the militia movement.
Second, federal officeholders that disagree with the movement are
therefore traitors to the people. Third, electoral politics will no
longer serve to tame this beast, because the traitors are not loyal
Americans with different views; rather, they are people plotting to
harm the American citizenry and subvert the American scheme of gov-
ernment. Accordingly, resistance to these officeholders is not rebel-
lion or civil war; it is legitimate revolution. In this sense, the militia's
theory of revolution depends on the creation of an "Other." This cre-
ation of an Other through conspiracy theories is thus necessary, not
contingent, to the militia theory of the Second Amendment: citizens
may revolt against "Them" precisely because "They" are not "Us." In-
deed, any revolutionary theory of the Second Amendment seems to
depend on the existence of such an Other. As long as citizens are a
part of the same political enterprise, they interact politically; only
when the system breaks down, when "it becomes necessary for one
people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with
another," must they interact militarily.
While all militia groups construct an Other, however, they disa-
gree on the precise identity of the Other. Correlatively, while all mili-
tia groups assert that there is an American People, they disagree on its
exact character as well. This Part will describe and analyze four such
visions of the American people and the Other that defines each. It
will suggest that all four visions fail on moral or empirical grounds.
Each one of these visions illustrates a major difficulty in defining or
constituting an American people under modern circumstances. Any
theory that posits the existence of such a People must address these
difficulties; in toto, they pose an enormous obstacle for a revolution-
ary theory of the Second Amendment.
To facilitate that analysis the following Parts divide militia think-
ing into four themes: overt racism, anti-internationalism, anti-social-
ism, and anti-secular humanism. These clusters of ideas are
analytically distinguishable in the militia materials, and each cluster
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presents different problems. Most militia groups, however, espouse
more than one of these themes, and some espouse all, believing that
an international conspiracy of socialistic secular humanists, domi-
nated by Jews and third world peoples in the United Nations, is trying
to disarm, secularize, and socialize the United States. Accordingly,
although this Article distinguishes the four visions for heuristic pur-
poses, this division should not obscure their overlap in the real world.
A. The Overt Racists
Probably the best publicized and most malign militia theme is
overt racism. In recent years, Christian Identity theology has provided
a shared set of core beliefs for many, from the Aryan Nations groups
in Idaho, 191 to the Covenant, the Sword, and the Anm of the Lord in
Arkansas, 192 to the Posse Comitatus in the plains states. 193 The most
famous Christian Identity group is probably the Order, led by Robert
Matthews, whose career of violence made headlines in the 1980s.194
The Order is not the only such group, however, with a criminal his-
tory.195 Indeed, some evidence suggests that McVeigh himself had ties
to Christian Identity groups1 96
Christian Identity is a bizarre, byzantine, and elaborate thought
system. The interested reader may find detailed expositions else-
where;197 this Article offers only the broad outlines. Some Christian
Identity groups are not made up of overt racists, but many are.198
Those in the latter category offer a lengthy re-telling of Biblical his-
tory. According to these groups, the union of Adam and Eve pro-
duced Abel, and Abel's progeny gave rise to the nations of Israel, who
were not, it turns out, Jews. Eve, however, also coupled with Satan to
produce Cain. After fleeing Eden, Cain mated with animals to pro-
191 SeejAMEs A. AHo, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS 93 (1990).
192 See CORCoRAN, supra note 45, at 238.
193 See id. at 29.
194 See JAMEs W. GIBSON, WARRIOR DREAMs 220-30 (1994).
195 As just one example, members of the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the
Lord firebombed a Jewish community center here in Bloomington, Indiana. See United
States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986); Laura Lane, Neo-
Nazis Admit Setting '83 Fire atJewish Center, BLOOMINGTON HERALD-TELEPHONE,JUly 18, 1985,
at 1.
196 Shortly before the bombing, McVeigh telephoned Elohim City, a Christian Identity
compound. Furthermore, the timing of the bombing may also be significant. Aside from
occurring on the anniversary of the assault on Waco, it also coincided with the scheduled
execution date for Richard Snell, a white supremacist who holds Christian Identity beliefs
and who plotted a similar bombing against the same building in 1983. SeeJo Thomas &
Ronald Smothers, Oklahoma City Building Was Target of Plot as Early as '83, Official Says, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 1995, at A6.
197 See, e.g., AHo, supra note 191, at 83-113;JAMEs COATES, ARMED AND DANGEROUS 77-
103 (1987).
198 See AHo, supra note 191, at 93-94.
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duce the "mud people," i.e., nonwhites. In 721 B.C., Sennacherib
took the northern tribes of Israel (who were not Jews) prisoner to
Assyria, where they became lost to history. According to Christian
Identity proponents, these lost tribes of Israel crossed the Caucasus
into Europe and became the ancestors of modern Europeans. One
tribe, Manasseh, eventually migrated to America to produce the
Founding Fathers and to enter into a new covenant with God, the
Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution.
Meanwhile, in 586 B.C., Nebuchadnezzar took the southern tribe
ofJudah into captivity to Babylonia. There, the tribe deteriorated by
converting to Satanism and breeding with the children of Cain. The
progeny of that union eventually became the people today known as
Jews. The true Jews, however-the Chosen People, the Davidic line to
whom God made the promises of both the Old and New Testa-
ments-are Europeans and the descendants of Europeans in America.
For centuries, the people called Jews have been trying to subvert
Christianity in general and the American way of life in particular.
Lately, they have succeeded in taking over the United States Govern-
ment, known to believers as "ZOG," an acronym for "Zionist Occupa-
tional Government."'199
To date, Christian Identity and other white supremacist groups
are fairly small, but they have been attempting to co-opt the recent
explosive membership growth in the militia movement.200 Some non-
racist (or less racist) militia leaders are aware of this danger and have
tried to combat it.201 Yet, although only a few militia members may
espouse Christian Identity in its extreme form, anti-semitic conspiracy
theories are fairly common. In particular, a significant number of mi-
litia groups20 2 believe that Jewish bankers have been controlling the
American government for a long time in order to line their own pock-
199 This summary is drawn from, inter alia, AHO, supra note 191, at 92-104 and GIBSON,
supra note 194, at 216-17.
200 See CHIP BERLET, POLITICAL RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, ARMED MILITIAS, RIGHT WING
POPULISM, AND SCAPEGOATING 4 (Apr. 27, 1995) (copy on file with the author); Hate Move-
ment Shifts Tactics in 1994, KIANwATCH INTELLIGENCE REP. #77, Mar. 1995, at 9, 10-11; MON-
TANA HUMAN RIGHTS NETwoRK, A SEASON OF DISCONTENT. MILITIAS, CONSTITUTIONALISTS,
AND THE FAR RIGHT IN MONTANA 2, 8 (May 1994); Hawkins, supra note 40, at 13.
201 See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note 40, at 13. For example, the Texas Militia urges:
"Open your militia to all races, creeds, religions. This is what America is really all about.
This is why they came...." Johnny Johnson, Texas Militia-Statement 3 (Feb. 11, 1995),
reprinted in STERN, supra note 14, app. 15. Similarly, the USMA does not "participate, sanc-
tion, or support" racist groups such as "the Nazis, Skin-heads, fascists, KEK," and it "al-
low[s] all men the full freedom and exercise of their conscience to worship." USMA
pamphl4 supra note 158, at 3.
202 This conspiracy theory has also been a staple of other right-wing extremists. See
BERLET, supra note 200, at 5.
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ets.2 03 Anti-semitic elements often combine with anti-internationalist
and anti-socialist convictions to conclude that Jewish agents in the
United Nations have taken over the federal government.2 04
For example, the Militia News explains that in the early years of
the republic, "with their rights and liberties insured [sic], and their
opportunities almost unlimited, and with their Christian heritage, de-
votion to God, and splendid work ethic, the nation grew and pros-
pered."20 5 Soon, however, the worm emerged in the apple: "Most
honest historians now know that the Civil War was created in order to
split and destroy the nation."206 This plot continues today:
[F]ollowing the turn of the 20th century, Communism (the Judeo-
Bolsheviks of Russia) and other diabolical movements and philoso-
phies-Fabian socialism, materialism, atheism, and secular human-
ism-would, like malignant parasites, establish themselves in
America.... The majority of the American people still have not
awakened to the fact that every war in this century has been con-
trived and created, and the people have been deceived into provid-
ing the resources and children to fight these wars for the benefit of
the international conspiracy which planned them.207
Gordon Kahl of the Posse Comitatus and Robert Mathews of the
Order are martyrs for the racist militia. They were both killed in con-
frontations with federal law enforcement, and both penned final let-
ters as death approached them. In wide circulation, these letters offer
a valuable insight into their view of the People. Kahl explained that
his troubles began:
[A]fter I discovered that our nation had fallen into the hands of
alien people, who are referred to as a nation within the other na-
tions. As one of our founding fathers stated, "They are vampires,
and vampires cannot live on vampires, they must live on Christians."
He tried to get a provision written into the U.S. Constitution that
would have prevented Jews from living inside the U.S. He warned
his brethren that if this was not done their children would curse
them in their graves, and that within 200 years their people (the
Jews) would be sitting in their counting houses rubbing their hands,
while our people would be slaving in the fields to support them.
This has happened exactly as was predicted .... We are a conquered
and occupied nation, conquered and occupied by the Jews and
203 For example, some militia members believe that eightJewish families control the
Federal Reserve System. See, e.g., Beth Hawkins, Conspiratorial VrWws, DETROIT METRO TiMES,
Oct. 12-18, 1994, at 13; Roger Tatarian, Rationale for Citizen Militias is Frightening, THE
FRESNO BEE, Nov. 20, 1994, at B7.
204 See infra part HIL.B.
205 Grady, supra note 39, at 1.
206 Id.
207 Id.
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their hundreds or maybe thousands of front organizations doing
their unGodly work. 20 8
Combining equal measures of white supremacy and anti-semitism,
Robert Matthews recounts the same kind of awakening as Kahl:
The stronger my love for my people grew, the deeper became my
hatred for those who would destroy my race, my heritage and
darken the future of my children.... By the time my son had ar-
rived I realized that white America, indeed my entire race, was
headed for oblivion unless white men rose and turned the tide.... I
came to learn that this was not by accident, that there is a small,
cohesive alien group within this nation working day and night to
make this happen. I learned that these culture disorders have an
iron grip on both major political parties, on Congress, on the me-
dia, on the publishing houses, and on most of the major Christian
denominations in this nation, even though these aliens subscribe to
a religion which is diametrically opposed to Christianity... . [T] o
be an FBI agent is to be nothing more than a mercenary for the
ADL and Tel Aviv.20 9
An article in the Aryan Nations's publication Calling Our People
encapsulates these themes of white supremacy, anti-semitism, and mi-
litia resistance.2 10 The unidentified author warns that the federal gov-
ernment has become oppressive, as evidenced by Waco and Ruby
Ridge, among other atrocities. 211 The guiding strategy for this op-
pression is the destruction of race-identity: "Since the 1930s, govt. psy-
chologists have attempted to alienate us from our [own] kind, to
make us hate ourselves and to foster the defeatist idea of Every Man
for Himself."2 12 To complete the enslavement, "[o]ur enemy has an-
nounced, via draconian new laws, that the [Second] Amendment and
therefore the entire Bill of Rights is dead."21 3 These nefarious
schemes will not, however, succeed because "We are the militia and
we are on the move," and "We will not be disarmed. ' 214 Relying on
the definition of the militia in the 1792 Militia Act, the author ex-
plains that the militia includes "'all [w]hite men between the ages of
18 and 45.' Since we live longer today, this must be modified to in-
clude all [w]hite men who do not work for the government."215 This
militia can handle any Zionist treachery that the government can dish
out: "We therefore are prepared for government to unleash its dogs
of war against us for no lawful purpose-for no reason at all other
208 Ajio, supra note 191, at 246.
209 Id. at 247-49.
210 The Militia, CALL G OUR NATION, No. 73, at 30.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 31.
213 Id. at 30.
214 Id.
215 Id.
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than as an act of [J] ewish terrorism designed to cow our fellow coun-
trymen into submission. '216
The vision of the American People for these militia groups is
clear: it includes white conservative Christians. In line with this vi-
sion, militia writers have developed a constitutional theory that limits
full citizenship to such persons. This theory distinguishes between
those groups made citizens by the Fourteenth Amendment and those
made citizens by the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The
former, so-called "Fourteenth Amendment citizens," have a status in-
ferior to the latter, so-called "sovereign" or "organic citizens." The
exact legal details of this inferiority vary among the theorists. Some
believe that all amendments after the Bill of Rights are currently void,
because they are the illegal products of ajewish conspiracy;217 accord-
ingly, Fourteenth Amendment citizens are not really citizens at all.
Others believe that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights are God's
law and as such may not be changed, but later amendments reflect
only the will of men and as such may be repealed. Accordingly, Four-
teenth Amendment citizens could lose their citizenship and rights
through constitutional amendment.218 Finally, still others believe that
Fourteenth Amendment citizens "do not have unalienable rights, only
limited statutory 'civil rights' that Congress has seen fit to grant
them."219 As a result, Congress could strip these citizens of all their
rights at any time.
To remove any doubt about the status of these inferior citizens,
James Pace has proposed an amendment to the Constitution. The
Pace Amendment has gathered many adherents, especially among
Christian Identity believers. 220 The amendment would first repeal the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.22' In their place, the new
provision would stipulate:
No person shall be a citizen of United States unless he is a non-
Hispanic white of the European race, in whom there is no ascertain-
able trace of Negro blood, nor more than one-eighth Mongolian,
Asian, Asia Minor, Middle Eastern, Semitic, Near Eastern, American
Indian, Malay or other non-European or nonwhite blood, provided
that Hispanic whites, defined as anyone with an Hispanic ancestor,
may be citizens if, in addition to meeting the aforesaid ascertainable
trace and percentage tests, they are in appearance indistinguishable
216 Id.
217 See CORCoRAN, supra note 45, at 28.
218 See Gun Rights Were Meant to Be Beyond the Reach of Government Officials (dis-
tribution of the Second Amendment Committee) (on file with the author); SEASON OF
DiscoNTENT, supra note 200, at 11.
219 Which Constitution?, THE PATRIOT, Jan. 1990, at 1.
220 See AHo, supra note 191, at 261.
221 Pace Amendment, Art. of Amend. XXVII § 1 (on file with author).
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from Americans whose ancestral home is in the British Isles or
Northwestern Europe. Only citizens shall have the right and privi-
lege to reside permanently in the United States. 222
The overt racists thus have adopted an incisive strategy for consti-
tuting a people in late twentieth-century America: the militia writers
solve the problem of diversity among the citizens by defining the citi-
zenry to include only those like them. That strategy has a certain his-
torical resonance: eighteenth century civic republicanism could posit
the existence of a common good because it restrictively defined the
citizenry. 223 And if it were normatively defensible, that strategy might
still work; white conservative Christians, even today, might have
enough commonality to constitute a people and to possess a common
good.
The strategy, however, is not normatively defensible. The overt
racists among the militia groups are, ultimately, recommending a spe-
cies of fascism or at least ethnonationalism. According to the overt
racists, Americans are a people because they share ethnic roots, and
these ethnic roots produce a spirit that brings sublime unity.2 24 Re-
cent history chronicles in horrifying detail the moral bankruptcy of
aggressive ethnonationalism. Indeed, the central proposition of mod-
em democratic political philosophy is that individuals have equal
moral worth regardless of race or religious affiliation. 22 5 Twentieth-
century America portrays itself as the nation that values all races and
cultures, and rejects ethnicity as a basis for nationhood.22 6 Over the
decades, many white separatists have fought the growing pluralization
of the American citizenry, but they have lost the demographic and
moral race. To deal with growing diversity, Americans have cele-
brated the importance of individual rights, to allow us each to go his
own way, even at the cost of unity.2 27
The overt racists among the militia groups thus demonstrate the
first great problem in constituting a people: the demographic prob-
lem. Like the overt racists, other revolutionary movements have com-
monly found their unity in a shared sense of racial, religious, ethnic,
or class identity. Modem Americans, however, share no such identity,
and any defensible definition of the American people must include all
222 Article of Amendment XXVII (on file with the author).
223 See Williams, supra note 18, at 602-03.
224 See Jost Delbruck, Global Migration-Immigration-Multiethnicity: Challenges to the
Concept of the Nation-State, 2 IND.J. GLOB. L. STUD. 45, 48-51, 57-58 (1994); David Williams,
European and U.S. Perspectives on Civic Republicanism, 2 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 71, 74-75
(1994).
225 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLTrICAL IBERAUSM 18-19 (1993).
226 See KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989); Delbruck, supra note 224, at
51-53.
227 See, e.g., HERBERT J. GANs, MIDDLE AMERICAN INDWIDUALISM: THE FUTuRE OF LB-
ERAL DEMOCRACY (1988).
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citizens, regardless of race, religion, ethnicity, gender, or class. The
demographic problem of creating peoplehood among highly diverse
persons is therefore a formidable task for any twentieth-century theory
of a revolutionary Second Amendment because the racist route to pe-
oplehood is closed to modem Americans.
B. The Anti-Internationalists
A second group believes that the New World Order, variously
identified as the United Nations, Jewish bankers, the Trilateral Com-
mission, and others, is subverting the American government. The de-
tails of the alleged conspiracy are endless, variable, and notoriously
subject to ridicule. Bill Clinton228 and George Bush 229 are both mem-
bers of this New World Order, as are many other government lead-
ers. 23 0 The conspiracy began when the United States entered the
United Nations in 1945 and thereby forfeited its sovereignty.231 Since
then, the United Nations has been attempting to disarm the armed
forces and citizens of its member countries to pave the way for global
domination.23 2 Recently, the United States armed services have be-
gun to train foreign troops on United States soil in preparation for
the subjugation of the U.S. population.23 3 The signs of invasion are
228 See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
229 See Police/Military Alert: United Nations Treachery Exposed, AiD & ABEr POIUCE NEWS-
LETrFR at 1, 1 (Special Edition No. 12).
230 One uncommonly complete list includes not only the predictable members of the
Clinton administration-Bruce Babbitt, Henry Cisneros, and Donna Shalala-but some
less likely candidates as well: Newt Gingrich, Larry Pressler, Sandra Day O'Connor, and
Laurence Silberman. See Fund to Restore an Educated Electorate, The CFR/Tilateral/New
World Order Connection (paid advertisement), PmEScoTr SuN, Dec. 1, 1993, at 11.
231 "Though not realized at the time, the UN Charter, ratified as a treaty by the Senate
and signed by the President, was an instrument of surrender." Louis Stradling, The Constitu-
tion vs. The UN Charter, AID & ABzr PoucE NEWSLE-rER at 5 (Special Issue Number 12). By
the 1950s, "the plans for the dissolution of the nation, the surrender of our sovereignty,
and the merger of the U.S. into a one world government under the United Nations was
well underway." Grady, supra note 39, at 1.
232 The plot seeks "the emasculation of our national security and the transfer of all our
military forces to a United Nations command in preparation for the New World govern-
ment." Grady, supra note 39, at 2. The conspirators will "[e]stablish an [i]nternational
[a]rmy under the United Nations to control the people of the world.... All independent
national military forces will be dissolved." The Central Yavapai Center for Action, The Hid-
den Agenda (paid advertisement), PREscoTt SuN, Dec. 1, 1993, at 11. They will "[d]isarm
citizens; transfer US military to the UN." Stradling, supra note 231, at 2.
233 "There are presently over one million (1,000,000) foreign troops in these United
States." Faulkner, supra note 35, at 6. "The federal government, at this Time, is transport-
ing large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to complete the work of Death, Desolation, and
Tyranny, already begun, often under the color of the law of the United Nations." THOMP-
SON, supra note 16, at 3.
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everywhere:234 black helicopters have begun to appear;235 money and
even human beings have been implanted with computer chips to keep
track of them;23 6 the government is constructing holding camps for
resisters;237 road signs have been marked to guide the invading
forces. 23 8 On an appointed day, the government will attack and dis-
arm all of the militias.239 Afterwards, the real purpose of FEMA will be
revealed: to impose and administer martial law after the suppres-
sion.240 The government perpetrated the bombing in Oklahoma City
in order to discredit the militia movement.24' The evidence of con-
spiracy is available on endless videotapes from militia catalogues. 242
In these theories, militia writers have created a foreign, powerful
Other in the New World Order, and they have correlatively consti-
tuted an embattled People. Indeed, if the theories were empirically
accurate, the projected conspiracy might, in fact, call forth an Ameri-
can People. The object of the plot is nothing less than the violent
destruction of the United States as a nation-state, and the American
leaders of the plot are literally traitors, in league with foreign bodies.
One publication explains:
No person can be loyal to the Constitution for the United States and
uphold the Charter of the United Nations. They are as opposite as
light and dark, good and evil, freedom and slavery, God and Satan.
No man can serve two masters. Support of the United Nations by gov-
ernment officials and employees is a violation of their oath. Wit-
tingly or unwittingly, it is treasonous.243
234 For those with the interest, MOM's publication TakingAim offers the most detailed
and complete conspiracy theories. See, e.g., MmA OF MONTANA, TAKING AIM (February
1995); MIrrtA OF MONTANA, TAKING AiM (Special Edition 1994).
235 "[M]ysterious military operations with 'black helicopters' [are] being conducted all
across the United States." Faulkner, supra note 35, at 6.
236 "All people will be required to maintain a federal identity card, ultimately a com-
puter chip under the skin of your hand will be the technique used to identify you and all
pertinent information about you." The Hidden Agenda, supra note 232, at 11.
237 "Why have tons of barbed wire and over 5,000 mattresses been off-loaded at Ft.
Chaffee, Arkansas?" Faulkner, supra note 35, at 6.
238 "Troop movement markers (bright colored reflective stickers on the backs of road
signs) and U.N. Troops are already in place in this country. . . ." THOMPSON, supra note 16,
at 5.
239 See Charles Zeps, ALERT! Militias Targeted 24/03/95, Talk. Politics. Guns, Mar. 24,
1995.
240 "When the federal government decides to enact martial law; and they will; the
[d]irector of FEMA becomes a virtual DICTATOR." Faulkner, supra note 35, at 5.
241 See Alex Heard, The Road to Oklahoma City, THE NEw REPUBUIC, May 15, 1995, at 15.
242 The Militia of Montana Catalogue, for example, lists the following videotapes,
among others: "America in Peril," "Equipping for the New World Order," "New World
Order Land and Farm Confiscation," New World Order Seminar," "New World Order-
Take Over of America," "Enroute to Global Occupation." Militia of Montana Catalogue,
supra note 12, at 2-5.
243 Strading, supra note 231, at 2.
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Another writer asserts: "The time is at hand when men and women
must decide whether they are on the side of freedom and justice, the
American republic, and Almighty God; or if they are on the side of
tyranny and oppression, the New World Order, and Satan."244
The problem with this vision of the People is that most Americans
believe that the conspiracy is a fantasy, a fabrication of the over-heated
imaginations of right-wing paranoiacs.2 45 Militia writers have an an-
swer to that charge: the New World Order has already taken over the
establishment media and made it a propaganda machine. 246 Most
American citizens naively trust the media, but they have been made
dupes.2 47 Since the militias trust only information obtained through
the militia network, they alone know the truth. These informed
agents are a revolutionary vanguard, a twentieth-century Paul Revere
calling the people to awaken before time runs out.2 48
That confident self-image is consistent with the historical Second
Amendment. The Anglo-American revolutionary tradition is satu-
rated with suspicion, even paranoia: the citizenry should always watch
for signs of a governmental plot to subvert liberty.2 49 The future lead-
ers of the revolution will see the signs of governmental plotting first,
and they have an obligation to alert the rest of the citizenry. Indeed,
the leaders of the American Revolution embraced exactly that self-
image: they perceived themselves as awakening first to imperial cor-
ruption and then seeking to open the eyes of others.250 In Second
Amendment theory, then, widespread disbelief in a conspiracy is irrel-
evant to its reality. For the Second Amendment, there is no authorita-
tive exponent of the truth: neither the king, Congress, the Supreme
244 Grady, supra note 39, at 3.
245 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
246 Step Three in the "Hidden Agenda" is to "[e]stablish a national propaganda
machine.... All national T.V. networks, national newspapers, and radio networks are
currently controlled by those that would destroy us." The Hidden Agenda, supra note 232, at
11. "Our national media has become nothing but the official mouthpiece of the govern-
ment, putting forth false 'polls' and outright propaganda to sway the public opinion ....
THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 5.
247 "The majority of the 240 million residents of the U.S. are non-thinking sheep, eas-
ily led and programmed." Grady, supra note 39, at 3. "To trusting Americans, it is unbeliev-
able, but veteran readers know that the NEW WORLD ORDER is to be a socialist
dictatorship. That popular media and high officials ignore or deny and ridicule it, con-
fuses people and thwarts organized opposition." Stradling, supra note 231, at 2. "The trust
people put in the media is beyond reason. As babes at the breast of Mother Media, they
suck their daily sustenance of managed 'news.'" Id. at 9.
248 "[T]here are millions who have not fallen for the propaganda and conditioning,
and of these millions, hundreds of thousands will physically resist. . . . These are our
hope." Grady, supra note 39, at 3.
249 See RIcHARD ASHcRAFr, REVOLUTIONARY PoLrcs AND LocKE's Two TREATiSES OF
GOvERNmENT 22-28 (1986); MMER, supra note 123, at 42, 183-97; Williams, supra note 18, at
565, 581-86.
250 See MAIER, supra note 123, at 224-27.
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Court, nor the media can dictate to us. The People alone can decide
the truth, but because the truth is often hidden, shadowy, and twist-
ing, the people need guidance from a small band of enlightened
patriots.2 5 1
Again, however, the militias ignore a critical constraint in Second
Amendment thinking: because only a People can make a revolution,
the whole People must be convinced of the plot before the revolution
can occur. Indeed, while the leaders of the American Revolution
wished to convince the People, they also believed that they could not
act until the People became convinced.2 52 It is important to under-
stand that this limit is not merely prudential (it takes a lot of people to
make a revolution) but moral (only a revolution made by the whole
for the whole is legitimate).253 The militias, then, must persuade the
rest of the citizenry of the existence of the need for revolution before
they commence resistance.
That obligation of universal persuasion highlights the next prob-
lem in constituting a People, the epistemological difficulty. For a rev-
olutionary People to exist, all citizens must see reality in the same way;
all citizens must perceive that the government has become so corrupt
that only armed resistance will suffice. For that state of affairs to exist,
two conditions must obtain. First, there must be an objective reality
independent of the observer. Recent epistemological work casts
doubt on that condition, perhaps in the sciences but certainly in
human affairs.2 54 Second, we must all-despite our radical differ-
ences in situation, values, life-history, cognitive frameworks-perceive
that objective reality in the same way.2 5 5 A diverse, late twentieth-cen-
tury citizenry is much less likely to share such a unifying perspective
than the eighteenth-century citizenry who had far more similar life
circumstances, cultural inheritance, and mental landscape.
251 The Militia News relies on Patrick Henry for its inspiration:
It is natural to man to indulge in the illusions of hope. We are apt to shut
our eyes against a painful truth. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a
great and arduous struggle for liberty? ... For my part, whatever anguish of
spirit it may cost, I am willing to know the whole truth; to know the worst
and to provide for it.
Grady, supra note 39, at 3. "What is needed is millions of Paul Reveres, shouting the
message, 'The enemy is here.'" Stradling, supra note 231, at 9.
252 See MAIER, supra note 123, at 224-27.
253 Id.
254 See Susan Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 63, 68-72
(1993). See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979)
(describing traditional epistemology as holding that human knowledge reflects such an
objective reality and criticizing that approach).
255 For criticisms of the possibility of such a "universal" perspective, see SANDRA HAR-
DING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? (1991); Naomi Scheman, Individualism and the
Objects of Psychology, in DISCOVERING REAL. FEMINIST PERSPECrTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND
METAPHYSICS 255 (Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983).
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The epistemology of militia groups illustrates this difficulty. They
reject the mainstream media; others accept the mainstream media.
Whom are we to believe and why? According to the militia, we should
believe them because they help make sense of recent history: the
country has fallen into such a terrible state that there must be a con-
spiracy afoot. Thus, one group explains: "The obvious deterioration
of the United States since the end of World War Two is really not a
mystery, it is the result of a hidden agenda initiated by the world so-
cialists starting in the early part of this century."256 As previously
noted, both Gordon Kahl and Robert Matthews describe their recog-
nition of the conspiracy as an epiphaneous experience, a clarification
of conditions that they had seen but not understood.2 57 According to
one close observer, the Posse Comitatus followed a similar line of rea-
soning: Farmers in the plains states were committed individualists, be-
lieving that individuals prospered or failed by their own work. By the
mid-1980s, however, many farmers-good men, responsible citizens-
were failing. How to explain this deplorable state? It must be the
product of a conspiracy by international Jewish bankers to enslave
true Americans. 258 In short, according to the militia, we can know
that they are right because they can explain why the country has de-
clined. There is, however, a problem with that epistemological argu-
ment only those who already believe that the country has declined
will find it convincing. Those whose condition has improved over the
last several decades-racial and religious minorities, autonomous wo-
men, gays and lesbians-will disagree. American citizens do not all
perceive recent trends in the same way.
Outside explanations of militia epistemology reflect the same
phenomenon. These, observers offer varying explanations of the ap-
peal of the militia's conspiracy theories. Some commentators main-
tain that right-wing movements like the militia reflect a human
proclivity to political paranoia, only barely contained in liberal democ-
racies;259 in particular, militia groups have appealed to groups that
feel unjustly disempowered.2 60 Others contend that militias gain
members much the same way as other associations: people make
friends with current members in church, at gun shops, in community
gatherings. They start to attend meetings and become drawn into the
social world of the militia. They soon stop listening to the mainstream
256 The Hidden Agenda, supra note 232, at 11.
257 See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
258 See CORCORAN, supra note 45, at 24-29.
259 See Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, in THE PARANOID
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 23-40 (1965); Eu SAGAN, THE HONEY AND
THE HEMLOCK: DEMOCRACY AND PARANOIA IN ANCIENT ATHENS AND MODERN AMERICA 13-34
(1991).
260 See BERLET, supra note 200, at 6.
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media and believe only things heard through their new friends.
Before long, they are epistemologically isolated.261 Whatever the real
explanation, all of these accounts of militia epistemology agree on
one point: conspiracy theories make sense to people with a particular
background and a particular perspective, who feel powerless and
come into contact with militias by frequenting places where militia
members gather. For these people, epistemology depends on ideol-
ogy and biography.
This dependence does not mean that militia members are
psychotic. Indeed, observers agree that the militia movement is a gen-
uine grass-roots phenomenon.262 On the whole, militia members are
ordinary people who believe in a conspiracy because that belief helps
them make sense of their world, given their values and personal histo-
ries.263 In that sense, the militia's epistemology is like much of the
rest of America's political culture. Liberals believe in right-wing con-
spiracies; conservatives believe in left-wing conspiracies; blacks believe
in white conspiracies; whites believe in black conspiracies; women be-
lieve in patriarchal conspiracies; and men believe in feminist conspira-
cies. This fracturing of American politics stems in part from the
disappearance of a shared epistemology. As the country reaches a cri-
sis of armed resistance, different groups will see different enemies
everywhere, and America will enter not revolution but civil war.
A revolution, then, depends on a People; a People depends on a
consensual epistemology; and there is reason to believe that Ameri-
cans lack such a shared epistemology. Presumably, citizens might be
able to construct a shared perception of reality through intense inter-
action, shared institutions, and common life circumstances. Paradoxi-
cally, however, militia epistemology reduces the likelihood of such an
achievement, because of its inclination to paranoia. To construct a
shared point of view, citizens must accept the legitimacy of each
other's perceptions and find a way to bridge them. Militias reject this
course. If Paul Revere and Thomas Gage did not see the world in the
same way, the reason was deception, not good faith disagreement, and
the answer was revolution, not reconciliation. In a world of plots and
suspicions, citizens are driven ever more apart, relying on personal
sources for information and seeing other groups as potential enemies.
In short, this mentality discourages the epistemological creation of a
People where one does not already exist. It thereby discourages the
creation of conditions necessary for the Second Amendment's
relevance.
261 See.Aino, supra note 191, at 162-63, 185-211.
262 See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note 40, at 13-14.
263 SeeAHo, supra note 191, at 135-63, 185-211.
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C. The Anti-Socialists
Another segment of militia thinking asserts that socialists control
the conspiracy in Washington. A "socialist" for these thinkers is any-
one who wishes to subvert American constitutional liberties. A revolu-
tion against a socialist plot is therefore a revolution to protect the
Constitution, or at least the Constitution as the revolutionaries under-
stand it. In making war on the Constitution, federal officeholders
have declared war on the American people, because it is the Constitu-
tion that makes us a people.
This theme is common to many militia groups. For example, the
Texas Constitutional Militia describes as its "MISSION": "To defend
the constitutions of the REPUBLIC OF TEXAS and of the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA. To uphold and to defend the Bill of Rights,
seen as unalienable, given by God to free men that they may remain
free."26 The Bill of Rights is under assault, and the people must re-
spond: "[I] t is to us, the inheritors of the task begun more than two
centuries ago, to seek and to secure these same ideals in the face of
the same threats expressed by Patrick Henry. '265 Similarly, the North
American Militia warns treasonous officials: "We are prepared... to
defend, with our life, our Rights to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness. We number in the thousands in your area and everywhere
else. How many of your agents will be sent home in body bags before
you hear the pleas of the people?"266 Federal Lands Update offered a
similar warning:
They (the feds) are going to continue to chip away at our Constitu-
tionally protected rights, until they wear us down, and we say,
"they've taken everything. I don't have anything left." Which is
what they are hoping for. Or, we (you) can say "HOLD! Enough!
You have no Constitutional authority to do these things and if you
insist, you will face armed and angry citizens." Why do you think
the militia are growing at such a substantial rate? Because the peo-
ple are mad .... 267
As a final example, MOM offers the people a clear choice:
The purpose of government is in the protection of the rights of the
people, when it does not accomplish this, the militia is the crusader
who steps forward, and upon it rests the mantle of defense of the
rights of the people .... We can leave our fate in the hands of
corrupted, self serving, foreign mercenaries... or we can return to
the original intent of our founding fathers (who bled and died for
264 Texas Militia-Statement, supra note 201, at 6.
265 Id.
266 Letter from North American Volunteer Militia to Judge Jeff Langton, supra note
160.
267 Faulkner, supra note 35, at 2.
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this country), in the defense of our God given- unalienable rights
268
Militia writers describe "us" or "the people" in opposition to the
governmental tyrants: "we" will make a revolution to defend "our"
constitutional rights unless "they" stop their oppression. What makes
an American people, then, is the possession of constitutional rights,
the shared resolution to defend them, and the anger at their per-
ceived violation.
This vision of the People, however, becomes more difficult to
maintain when examined in light of the militia writers' vision of par-
ticular constitutional rights. First, as Part I has already explained, the
Second Amendment is the cornerstone of the militia's interpretation
of the Bill of Rights. Militias condemn the Brady Bill and the assault
rifle ban as not only unconstitutional, but also as part of a conspiracy
to subvert the Second Amendment, without which other amendments
and American liberty cannot stand. Similarly, the incidents at Waco
and Ruby Ridge were not merely bungled attempts to serve arrest war-
rants; they were part of a conspiracy to disarm the public and elimi-
nate citizens who stand in the government's way.
Second, many militia thinkers argue that the mandatory income
tax is unconstitutional; indeed the tax resistance movement, at times,
substantially overlaps the militia movement. Many tax resisters couch
their positions in elaborate legal arguments; such arguments, rather
than violence, may be their most characteristic activity.26 9 Tax resist-
ers make a variety of arguments, but courts have adopted none of
them. For example, many tax resisters believe that the Sixteenth
Amendment was never properly ratified: "The 16th Amendment,
which permits federal income taxes, WAS NOT ratified in the same
language by three fourths of United States as required by Article V of
the Constitution and is therefore invalid."270 Others maintain that a
citizen need not complete tax returns because the Fifth Amendment
protects him from giving the government incriminating information
against himself.2 7 ' Still others believe that the progressive income tax
violates the Just Compensation Clause because "[h]igh wage earners
are taxed to fund welfare and other entitlements."272
268 THE MILrrIA, supra note 34, at 8.
269 See, e.g., AHo, supra note 191, at 37-42.
270 THE FaE MmrrA, supra note 36, at 44. See CORCORAN, supra note 45, at 51. For
example, Linda Thompson explains: "The Federal Government, under the Constitution,
never had the legal authority to pass a national tax on income and the 16th Amendment
(the law that enacted the income tax) was never ratified, as required by law." THOMPSON,
supra note 16, at 5.
271 See AHo, supra note 191, at 39.
272 THE FREE MjLrrm, supra note 36, at 45.
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Third, anti-socialists claim that much federal regulation of private
and federal land is unconstitutional. The so-called "Wise Use" move-
ment also overlaps with the militia movement and has its own detailed
ideology.2 73 Wise Use supporters advance two main contentions.
First, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from telling a
citizen what to do with his own property. This restriction would bar
virtually all regulation. For example, the Free Militia denounces prop-
erty restrictions as Fifth Amendment violations:
The use of your property can and is restricted by municipal zoning
codes, state and federal environmental laws, and other governmen-
tal regulations for the "public good", even if the use of the property
that is forbidden does not harm the lives or property of others. All
of these regulations somehow limit the personal use of the property
and many limit or reduce the property's commercial productivity or
value on the real estate market.274
Second, the Constitution bars the government from limiting the ac-
cess of private citizens to public lands and resources. According to
some, the "Equal Footing" doctrine grants to every state all federal
lands located within that state, so that the state, but not the federal
government, may limit access.2 75 According to others, however, even
states cannot limit access because public resources belong to the
people.2 76
In short, according to the militia writers, the Constitution man-
dates an extreme libertarian scheme. Anything more centrist (in the
present political spectrum) is "socialism," a term militia writers use as
an epithet to ostracize those who disagree with them. The prophecy
attributed to Sarah Brady sums up this attitude: "Our task of creating
a socialist America can only succeed when those who would resist us
have been totally disarmed." One publication calls supporters of the
Clinton administration "Clintonistas," ostensibly to associate them
with South American communist movements.2 77 Federal Lands Update
warns:
[T]he belief that private property makes us unequal still has mil-
lions of adherents here in America. These true believers normally
do not use the S word (socialist) to describe themselves. They know
well that most Americans are too politically illiterate to recognize
273 See, e.g., Elizabeth Larson, Secessionism in the West THE DEFENDER, Nov. 1994, at 1, 9.
274 THE FREE MILrnA, supra note 36, at 44.
275 See Larson, supra note 273, at 1.
276 For example, the North American Militia warns state officeholders: "You have state
agents who are threatening to take wildlife from an individual. The individual is not a
corporation and has certain unalienable rights. The state of Montana does not own the
wildlife. The regulations do not pertain to the human being inhabitants of Montana."
Letter from North American Volunteer Militia to Judge Jeff Langton, supra note 160.
277 For example: "The bad news is that the Clintonistas want your property and are
serious about stealing it." McALvAmw INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR, supra note 95, at 18.
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socialism even as it bites them in the paycheck every Friday in the
form of income taxes, FICA, et cetera.27 8
Finally, in answer to the question "Does the USMA have any political
agenda?", the group answers: "No. We are not Democrats, Republi-
cans, Independents, etc. Except that we are also not Socialists and
Communists and allow none such to belong."27 9 Socialists, in short,
are beyond the pale, not a legitimate part of the militia or the Ameri-
can People.
There are two difficulties with constituting an American People
in this way. First is the interpretive difficulty: the meaning of the Con-
stitution is itself the subject of enormous controversy-witness the fu-
ror over bussing, abortion, affirmative action, gay rights, women's
rights, prayer in public schools, flag burning. For the Constitution to
make us a People, there must be something approaching consensus
on the meaning of that document. In recent years, however, the Con-
stitution has generated as much dissension as agreement. An insur-
rection begun in the name of the Constitution would therefore in fact
be a rebellion made for a particular interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, not for the People as a whole. The militia's own interpretation
of the Constitution illustrates this danger. The militias claim to be
speaking for the people, but they speak in fact only for a minority.
Large majorities supported the Brady Bill and the assault weapons
ban, and very few believe the income tax or federal land regulation
are unconstitutional. 28 0
The militias answer this difficulty by declaring everyone else
wrong. They argue that if only everyone were to use the correct inter-
pretive technique, there would be agreement. Not surprisingly, mili-
tia writers' version of the technique, preferred by many right-wing
theorists, is that citizens should passively heed the text of the Constitu-
tion and the Framers' original intent. The Militia News, for example,
asserts that the text is self-interpreting:
[T] he vast majority of U.S. citizens are reasonably intelligent and
can read, and the Constitution and Bill of Rights are written in plain
language (the same English we read and write today) and are not
difficult to understand .... The Second Amendment... consists of
27 plainly written words .... This declaration of the absolute, une-
quivocal, inalienable right of the people to be armed, needs no
interpretaion.2 8 1
278 James Catron, Watch Out!, FEDERAL LANDS UPDATE, Oct. 1994, at 3.
279 USMA pamphlet, supra note 158, at 3.
280 According to one poll, only 33% of white males and 22% of all others believe that
"citizens have the right to arms themselves in order to oppose the power of the Federal
Government." Smolowe, supra note 3, at 68.
281 Grady, supra note 14, at 5-6.
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MOM also emphasizes the importance of the Framers' intent, attribut-
ing to Madison the imprecation: "[ D] o not separate text from histori-
cal background. If you do, you will have perverted and subverted the
constitution, which can only end in a distorted, bastardized form of
illegitimate government." 28 2
These simple recommendations, however, underestimate the dif-
ficulty in reaching consensus on the meaning of the text. From the
moment of its adoption, the Constitution has generated multiple
schools of interpretation. 28 3 Constitutional scholars generally agree
that the broad phrases of the Constitution, including "due process,"
"equal protection," and "privileges and immunities," are too open-
ended to generate determinate, consensual interpretations. 28 4 In-
deed, much constitutional theory argues that language can have
meaning only within an interpretive community that shares a frame-
work of usage and analysis. 285 As the militias demonstrate, America is
not one, unified interpretive community with reference to the Consti-
tution. Even the justices of the Supreme Court, despite sharing a legal
culture, often cannot agree. Consequently, many important cases re-
sult in split decisions, hindering the coherent development of the law.
The frequency of such cases might be accelerating.28 6
In the face of such interpretive disagreement, militia writers
reach for their inevitable trump card: those who disagree with them
on the meaning of the Constitution must be parties to or dupes of the
conspiracy. Thus, The Militia News describes those who differ with the
militia's reading of the Constitution: "[T]he authors of those docu-
ments [the Bill of Rights and the Constitution] anticipated this very
problem with those who would usurp the people's rights, and those
weak and unprincipled souls who would foolishly compromise or sur-
render their rights."28 7 To disagree with the militia, in other words, is
ipso facto to be cast outside of the volk. In fact, however, it is not
282 THE MILITIA, supra note 34, at 3-4.
283 See TRIBE, supra note 73, at 301.
284 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 73, at 13-41; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HoNoRA-
BLE COURT 42-43 (1985); GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL., CONSTrIUTIONAL LAW 38-39 (2d ed.
1991). Some deny that language can ever produce determinate meaning, even under the
best circumstances, but I need not go that far for present purposes.
285 See RONALD DWOREiN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986); STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS
CLAss? (1980); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982);
William M. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1990);
William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 541
(1988).
286 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (six opinions); Board of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (six opinions);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (five opinions).
287 Grady, supra note 14 at 5-6. Sadly, such accusations of bad faith are also common
in the scholarly debate over the Second Amendment. SeeAndrewJay McClurg, The Rhetoric
of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L REv. 53 (1992).
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traitorous to the American people to believe that the income tax and
environmental protection are constitutional; it is merely to differ in
good faith. Again, the mentality of suspicion actually subverts the pos-
sibility of a true revolution. If each group believes that disagreement
can only be the product of treason and deceit, then a people suffi-
ciently unified to make a revolution will never come into being.
The second difficulty with the anti-socialist position is the polit-
ical problem: to become a people, individuals must find ways to inter-
act. That process usually involves institutions that bring together
people from different backgrounds and allow/teach them to form a
common venture. In ancient politics, the Athenian Assembly is a clas-
sic example. In American history, the universal militia was supposed
to serve that function.288 Because of their extreme libertarianism,
however, anti-socialist militias leave little space for such interactive,
universal institutions.
Militia writers are very suspicious of the authority of any govern-
ment, even democratic ones. In their view, individuals do not have
rights only within a political system. Instead, individuals have the
right to declare themselves entirely outside any political system, pos-
sessing all the powers normally associated with government. Thus,
Linda Thompson concludes her Declaration of Independence:
We, therefore the sovereign citizens of the several states of the
united states ... Declare, that each of the sovereign citizens under-
signed are, and of Right ought to be, Free and Independent Sover-
eign Citizens . . . each has the full Power to levy War, conclude
Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other
Acts and Things which an Independent Sovereign may of right
do.289
By contrast, Jefferson's Declaration of Independence spoke not of in-
dividuals, but of a people severing its bonds with another.
The militias make no claim to bind the individual. The choice to
join is entirely voluntary, the product of spontaneous individual voli-
tion rather than of universal institutions. As the Texas Volunteer Mili-
tia puts it: "START YOUR MILITIA AND PATRIOTS WILL
COME."2 90 The militia internet sites are full of advice on how to at-
tract members. Significantly, the militias intentionally recruit from a
288 See Williams, supra note 18, at 603-04, 607-09.
289 THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 3. Similarly, Calvin Greenup and others published an
open letter in a local newspaper declaring: "I... solemnly Publish and Declare my Ameri-
can National Status and Rights to emancipate absolute my 'res' in trust from the foreign
jurisdiction known as the municipal corporation of the District of Columbia.... By this
emancipation I return to an estate of primary sovereignty and freedom that pre-exists all
government(s)." Letter to the Editor, RAvALLI REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1993, reprinted in STERN,
supra note 14, app. 7.
290 Texas Militia-Statement, supra note 201, at 3.
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relatively restricted pool of citizens. One posting advises: "Try to find
like-minded persons in your area. Ask around. Try patriotic organiza-
tions, such as the VFW and the American Legion. Sound out people
at gun shows and gun stores."291
Within the militia, majority votes have no authority for the dis-
senting minority because withdrawal is always an option. Thus, MOM
provides that it may "not be called into service without the sustaining
vote of the Unit."292 A "sustaining vote" requires unanimity: "At the
time of the 'call to arms,' each man shall verbally sustain such call, to
his immediate Officer, and in the roll call, 'all voices present' shall be
presented to the Unit Commander as unanimous for the impending
action and service. ' 293 At the revolution, militia members may depart
at any time: "No member of the Unit shall be compelled to serve in a
conflict which he can not morally support in his heart with all of his
might and strength."294 Similarly, "The Unit Commander shall be
chosen by unanimous voice," but if unanimity is not possible, "dissatis-
fied members... may resign... for the purpose of forming a separate
and independent Unit."295
The militia vision of the relationship between individuals and
government is thus almost a parody of classical liberalism. Individuals
exist before governments, complete and whole in themselves. Each
individual makes the choice to enter or leave a polity at any time for
his own reasons. Accordingly, everywhere and always, supra-individual
organizations exist and take action only by the actual consent of each
and every member. This theory of the social contract, moreover, is
not just a metaphorical explanation for the origin of governmental
authority; it is a prescription for the day-to-day conduct of historical
governments and citizens. If citizens come together and find that they
agree, all is well and good. If not, then individuals should simply go
their separate ways.m 6
291 How to Activate the Constitutional Militia in Your Area, posted TALK. Potrrics.
GuNs, March 24, 1995. Similarly, another posting urges: "The [recruiting] team should
visit likely places and persons who might refer them to prospective recruits. Gun shops,
American Legion and VFW halls, civic organizations, sheriff and fire departments." Jon
Roland, Militia Organizing-Advance Teams, posted TALK. POLrrICS. GUNS, March 24, 1995.
292 The Militia of Montana, Sanders County, Unit Alpha, RuLEs AND REGULATIONS 2 (copy
on file with the author).
293 Id. at 3.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 1.
296 An interview with Norman Olson, a cofounder of the Michigan Militia, nicely
brings the interpretive and political problems together. The interviewer asked Olson, "[Ilf
you establish 83 militias in every county in the state, who's to say that they'll all agree?"
Olson responded, "You have to listen to our mission: defend the Constitution and see that
all men remain free." The interviewer then pointed out the interpretive problem: "But
hundreds of courts interpret the Constitution differently.... Who would decide if there
were dozens of militias?" Olson's answer to that difficulty raised the political difficulty
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This propensity to endless schism, when applied to revolutionary
militias, virtually ensures that any armed resistance to government will
result in civil war rather than a universal revolution. Entirely absent
from the anti-socialist vision of human interaction are the political
commitments that might make the construction of a People possible:
devotion to the citizenry as a whole and the nation as a structure; reso-
lution to discuss differences, compromise, re-conceptualize one's own
interests, enter into the perspective of others; recognition of the
bonds that connect those in an ongoing political enterprise. In short,
the anti-socialist mentality will lead the citizenry closer to fragmenta-
tion, not closer to Peoplehood. And that mentality is notjust a prob-
lem for the militia. Significantly, the bulk of the American public
shares the militia's contempt for politics, although perhaps in a less
extreme form; indeed, the most noticeable trend of the 1990s is wide-
spread alienation from the whole political system.2
9 7
D. The Anti-Secular Humanists
Finally, many militia members believe that the alleged conspiracy
is attempting to replace God with secular humanist dogma in the
hearts and minds of Americans. The Militia News recites a familiar
litany:
We observe the systematic de-Christianization of the nation as the
courts display an animosity towards every Christian symbol and
every manifestation of Christian practice, teaching and belief. Bible
distribution and even Bible reading is prohibited in government
schools. Crosses, crucifixes and nativity scenes are banished from
public property. Cross shaped gravestones are being removed from
military cemeteries. Public prayer is prohibited at school sponsored
events. Even the Pledge of Allegiance is now forbidden in many
schools because of the phrase "one nation under God."298
Similarly, part of the "Hidden Agenda" of the New World Order is to
"[d] estroy religious faith and moral standards. The government has
taken God and his morality from us and in it's [sic] stead supports
abortion, gay rights, schools dispensing contraceptives, and activities
void of ethics .... ,,299
According to militia writers, this de-Christianization is especially
shameful because Christianity forms the basis of American pe-
oplehood. In this view America has been a great nation because it was
instead: "What happens if a person doesn't like the philosophy of the brigade? He just
walks away-that's it." Downes, supra note 108, at 4. This ultimate solution-the exit op-
tion-may allay worries about the rights of the individual, but it practically guarantees the
disintegration of a revolutionary people.
297 See STANLEY B. GREENBERG, MIDDLE CLASS DREAMS (1995).
298 Grady, supra note 14, at 2.
299 The Hidden Agenda, supra note 232, at 11.
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founded on Christianity.300 Indeed, the basis of the American legal
system and the Constitution itself is Christian law.30' Therefore, to de-
Christianize America is to violate the Constitution and to traduce
America's way of life as a people. Officials who seek to do so are trai-
tors and oath-breakers.30 2 At this point, anti-secular humanism often
merges with anti-socialism in a belief that the government has begun a
systematic assault on the liberties of American gunowners, property-
holders, and Christians. 30 3
In this strain of militia thinking, the American People contains all
and only those committed to God's law, as the militia understands it;
the Other consists of those committed to taking God out of our Godly
republic. This vision well illustrates most of the foregoing difficulties
in constituting a unified people in late twentieth century America.
First, it faces the demographic difficulty: it facially excludes liberal
Christians, Jews, Moslems, Buddhists, nonbelievers, and others.30 4 Ac-
300 The Texas Constitutional Militia urges its chapters to
[elducate its members in... the Bible, which has been the greatest single
guiding influence for all great nations desiring to be free.... [and to]
[s]eek the protection, wisdom, and leadership of Almighty God as we sub-
mit to Him to do His will in protecting the liberty and freedom He has
given to all Americans.
Texas Constitutional Militia-Statement, supra note 201, at 7.
301 Gordon Kahl raged in his last letter- "These enemies of Christ have... thrown our
Constitution and our Christian Common Law (which is nothing other than the Laws of
God as set forth in the Scriptures) into the garbage can." AHo, supra note 191, at 246.
One publication explains that our constitutional rights are "the divine endowment of the
Creator to each person.... Note that there is no mention of HUMAN or CIVIL rights."
Stradling, supra note 231, at 3. Under the Constitution, "our system ofjustice is founded in
the wisdom of God based on Bible laws preserved through centuries by Anglo-Saxons." Id.
at 4.
302 God intends the government to do you good by maintaining law, order,
andjustice. When the government systematically punishes the upright citi-
zen and commends wrongdoing, it is no longer serving God's purpose ....
If we are submitted to Jesus Christ and committed to Constitutional liber-
ties, then our conscience demands the resistance of unconstitutional au-
thority, which is no authority at all.
THE FREE MxrM, supra note 36, at 11. In short, "WHEN ELECTED OFFICIALS BREAK
THEIR OATH TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, IT IS NOT THE PATRIOTIC Cm-
ZEN WHO IS IN REBELLION, BUT THE GOVERNING OFFICIAL." Id.
303 For example, the Free Militia lists as examples of "violated civil rights":
For a generation we have had legalized abortion which denies the right of
the unborn child to live.... Attempts have recently been made to require
state certification of private school teachers and homeschoolers. ... The
America 2000 education program is designed to standardize the curriculum
in and centralize control of all public schools by imposing 'outcome based'
education...."
THE FREE MnrIA, supra note 36, at 40-41.
304 One distribution is overt (and slightly more inclusive than most) about the denomi-
national battle lines: in the New World Order,
[a]ll congregations affiliated with the National Council of Churches and
liberal Jewish councils, may continue to function. These groups are not
incompatible with the aims and designs of the Alliance. However, all other
fundamental, independent, Bible-centered congregations; all conservative
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cording to the militia, these citizens at best deserve toleration because
this country was not made for them. Second, this vision of the people
faces the interpretive difficulty: many, perhaps most, Americans (in-
cluding the Supreme Court) do not believe that the Constitution pro-
hibits abortion,30 5 allows prayer in public schools,30 6 or more
generally codifies the Christian Bible.30 7 Indeed' , "m iy Christians do
not interpret the Bible to prohibit abortion or homosexuality or to
encourage the commingling of church and state.308 Finally, this vi-
sion faces the epistemological difficulty: the militia believes that the
de-Christianization of America is the product of a deliberate, unified
conspiracy to subvert America by eliminating its fidelity to and reli-
ance on the Almighty. Other Americans have a different view of real-
ity: the Supreme Court banned prayer in public schools and
restrictions on abortion because the justices were concerned about
the rights of children and women; states have liberalized laws against
homosexuality because many Americans no longer regard gays as
monsters; in general, America has demoted Christianity from its privi-
leged legal position out of a conviction that the Constitution man-
dates equal treatment for all religions.
Armed resistance for God's People, in short, would not be a
revolution for the whole of the citizenry; it would be the start of a civil
war along cultural battle lines that are all too familiar.30 9 With the
exception of some killings at abortion clinics, synagogue bombings,
and militia assassinations, America has waged this cultural war primar-
ily through political and judicial channels. The militias hope to trans-
form that metaphorical war into a real war, and they intend to be
better armed and trained than their enemies. Like the other militia
visions of the People, in other words, this one does not include all
Americans in its revolutionary movement. Instead, the vision's real
function is to categorize some citizens as True Americans and to ex-
clude others as traitors, based on differences in values and identities.
The practical meaning of the vision is plain: if the militia cannot de-
feat these enemies through political or judicial means, its members
have the right to shoot them.
Greek and Russian Orthodox churches; Orthodox Hebrew synagogues and
Roman Catholic parishes with large Eastern European ethnic constituen-
cies, will cease operation at once.
John Grady, When Will It Happen? (one-page handout on file with the author).
305 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
306 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
307 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
308 See BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD 10-11, 230-
31 (1993).
309 See id. at 157-251.
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CONCLUSION: A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF REVOLUTION
In a large sense, the United States Constitution and the general
Anglo-American political tradition contemplate two ways for the peo-
ple to take collective action. Today, we are very familiar with one way:
the ordinary method of government through politics and law. This
system contains specific limits on the government's abuse of power:
electoral accountability, separation of powers, federalism, and individ-
ual rights. If the people disagree among themselves or if the govern-
ment disagrees with some of the people, authoritative methods exist
for resolving those differences, including election results and court
decrees. If the form of government is well-designed, these resolutions
may be presumptively just.
For the Framers, however, no form of government could guaran-
tee that powerholders would not become corrupt. The Framers
therefore foresaw that the people might have to re-take power into
their own hands through the second form of collective action: resist-
ance and revolution. The primary textual basis for this form of action
is the Second Amendment. While Articles I, II, and III give power to
the people "in-doors," tamed in formal channels of government,310
the Second Amendment, by contrast, contemplates the People "out-
of-doors,"3 11 regnant, militant, and creating the channels for its ex-
pression. 312 This civic republican armato populato is the final limit
on governmental power.
310 See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 2, c. 1 (election of representatives); U.S. CONST. amend.
XVII (direct election of senators); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (election of president); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1903) (describing the Supreme Court as the agent and
protector of the people in exercising judicial review).
311 Gordon Wood put the phrase, "the people out-of-doors," into wide circulation to
describe the people acting on their own initiative, outside the ordinary channels of govern-
ment. See WooD, supra note 8, at 319-28.
312 The "Yale School" of constitutional interpretation might appear to propose a third
form of popular constitutional action, between the people tamed and the people militant.
Professor Akhil Amar, for example, argues that the American citizenry has a right to
amend the Constitution by a simple majority vote. Article V of the Constitution, with its
requirement of a supermajority, prescribes only those procedures that the government must
follow in initiating change. Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Artide V, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 457, 457-58 (1994). Bruce Ackerman argues
that, under special conditions, the people may engage in a process of self-conscious delib-
eration leading to "higher lawmaking." When this deliberation results in widespread con-
sensus on matters of principle through the populace and the branches of government, it
effectively becomes a new constitutional regime. BRUCE AcKERmAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUN-
DATIONS 266-69 (1991). For the purposes of this Article, however, Amar and Ackerman
are describing actions of the people tamed, for they both assert that the people must act
through formal, constrained, and peaceful channels. By contrast, in a revolution, the body
of people must act as an organic unit outside of normal governmental channels because,
by definition, the people are revolting against government. Thus, as Amar points out, a
revolution "required no vote of the People themselves." Amar, supra, at 500. Similarly, in
Ackerman's scheme, a proposed amendment must secure support through the normal
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Who, however, will limit the people? Scholars who endorse an
individual rights theory of the Second Amendment might suggest that
this question is illegitimate because the people, as the fountainhead of
all legitimate authority, are entirely and always trustworthy. Indeed,
some of these theorists accuse gun control advocates of an elitist dis-
trust of the masses.313 In the end, the people must therefore stand as
their own limit; they are at the end of the regression, and there is
nowhere else to turn.
That conclusion, however, is overly simple. Democracies must of
course trust the people's judgment, but that claim is merely a plati-
tude, because it leaves unspecified the meaning of "the people" and
'judgment." It is one thing to trust the people's will as expressed
through the institutions of a deliberative democracy; it is quite an-
other thing to trust an enraged mob. Indeed, the Constitution itself is
full of limits on simple democracy.3 14 One of the most familiar roles
for the Supreme Court is as a restraint on hysterical majorities, a sober
second thought.3 15 Furthermore, the Senate was originally intended
to be a semi-aristocratic limit on the popular House of Representa-
tives;3 16 to this day, it is not strictly majoritarian.3 17 James Madison
himself believed that direct democracy would imperil justice. He
hoped that representatives would refine popular opinion, engaging in
rational discourse about the aggregate interests of the community.318
More recently, a wave of neo-republican constitutional scholarship has
espoused the ideal of deliberative democracy, in which the people ac-
tively discuss their common identity. Such a system would differ pro-
foundly from a simple majoritarian democracy, in which individuals
passively vote their perceived self-interest.3 19
In short, for the people to act, they must assume some particular
political or cultural form such as the electorate, a jury, the universal
militia, or consumers. There is no such thing as the People simplic-
channels of popular deliberation and all three branches of government, not through vio-
lent popular action. AcKEMAN, sup-a, at 266-69.
313 See Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms
Vzewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS LJ. 1, 37, 71-73; Kates, supra note 31, at
226-27; Levinson, supra note 31, at 658-659; Reynolds, supra note 164, at 466-68, 495.
314 See U.S. CoNsr. amends. I-VII, XII-XV, XIX (forbidding legislatures from limiting
individual rights).
315 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (describing the
Court's work as representing "the balance [between order and liberty] struck by this coun-
try, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well
as the traditions from which it broke").
316 See WOOD, supra note 8, at 553-62.
317 See U.S. CONs-r. art. I, § 3, cl.1 (senators represent states, not population).
318 See THE FEDERausr No. 10, supra note 47, at 126-27.
319 See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic; 97 YAE LJ. 1493 (1988); Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543
(1986); Cass 1_ Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Reviva4 97 YALE LJ. 1539 (1988).
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iter or in the abstract Importantly, some of these forms promotejus-
tice better than others: a deliberative democracy is a better ideal for
popular action than the war of all against all. Particular resistance
movements might fall anywhere on this continuum, depending on
their historical details. Americans might therefore welcome some rev-
olutions but not others, and, correlatively, they might espouse a right
of revolution in certain times and places but not in others. Like al-
most everything else, it all depends. It is rational and not undemo-
cratic to fear civil war, anarchy, and rebellion.
The Framers of the Second Amendment would agree with that
conclusion. They were not indiscriminate proponents of revolution;
indeed, they were always fearful that the revolutionary people would
become nothing more than a mob.3 20 They felt, however, that they
had two protections against such degeneration. First, the people were
formed into a universal militia, raised and disciplined by the state.
Second, American citizens were a republican People-homogeneous,
virtuous, and committed to the common good. These qualities made
it possible to trust the people in 1776, but one should not always and
everywhere trust the people out-of-doors. Resistance made by an un-
virtuous population-such as the laboring classes of European cities-
could not be a revolution for the common good.3 2' In short, unlike
some modem proponents of a revolutionary Second Amendment, the
Framers worried not only about limiting government by an armed
populace but also about limiting the armed populace itself.
Even in the late eighteenth century, the Framers may have been
wrong in supposing that American were a unified People; they may
have been conjuring with the concept of a People, because otherwise
their republican structure of thought would crumble. Militia writers
might argue that if conjuring with the People was good enough for
Patrick Henry, then it should be good enough for modem Ameri-
cans-or, more precisely, then it is a constitutionally sanctioned form
of rhetoric. In fact, however, even if conjuring with the People was
once constitutionally sanctioned, the situation has changed. First, the
Framers of the Second Amendment gave the People an institutional
form-the universal militia-celebrated in the Second Amendment.
The United States no longer maintains such a militia; the citizenry,
apart from conventional politics, is merely a collection of individuals.
Second, the Constitution itself has changed. The original Constitu-
tion allowed, even promoted, corporate unities of the sort that might
ground peoplehood. States could and did maintain religious estab-
lishments; the citizenry was limited to white males; the Bill of Rights
320 See MAIER, supra note 123, at 41-48, 68-69.
321 See DREw R. McCoy, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC 15-16, 23-38 (1980).
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had little substantive reach.322 Today, the Constitution has become a
great protector of liberal individualism. American society is no longer
a Christian, white, male citizenry, and citizens have individual rights to
make personal life choices. In short, Americans no longer exhibit
commonality in part because the Constitution protects the right not
to be part of a commonality. In such a legal regime, conjuring with
the People is no longer a constitutionally sanctioned form of rhetoric.
The most important change, however, is that over the last 200
years, diversity has become a permanent and accepted part of the
American political landscape. In the 1790s, the Framers of the Sec-
ond Amendment could still conjure with a People because even if the
American citizenry did not meet that ideal, the Framers hoped to
make it do so. Today, that hope is dramatically less viable; for many, it
is no longer even attractive. This Article has detailed the demo-
graphic, epistemological, interpretive, and political difficulties in con-
stituting a people today. Those difficulties strongly counsel that it is
time to stop conjuring with the people. It is possible that a People
does exist; if not, it is possible that a People may be created. Unless
and until such conditions are demonstrated, however, the revolution-
ary Second Amendment by its own terms does not apply to late twenti-
eth-century America.
That conclusion would have filled the Framers with foreboding.
It certainly fills the militia movement with dread, and it probably fills
many adherents of the individual rights view of the Amendment with
concern. If Americans lose the constitutional right to revolution, then
they have no choice but to trust ordinary politics and law to protect
them from oppression. If the government ever falls into the hands of
a committed tyrant, those structures may not provide sufficient protec-
tion. That threat is real, and in my view it is right to worry about it.
The great strength of the individual rights theory is its realism on this
point: citizens may live under a basically just system now, but there is
no guarantee that it will always be so.
But the right to bear arms cannot guarantee that the American
system will remain just either. Votes may not secure ajust society, but
neither could an armed populace. The individual rights theory is real-
istic about the threat of government tyranny, but it is profoundly un-
realistic about the threat of revolutionary tyranny. Today, armed
resistance is no less likely to bring oppression in its wake than is gov-
emnment. In other words, the citizenry forfeited its effective right to
armed revolution some time ago, not through the decision of a court,
but through historical changes. Even if the Supreme Court guaran-
teed each individual the right to arms tomorrow, even if Congress sup-
322 See 2 SCiwARTz, supra note 54.
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plied each home with an assault weapon, citizens still could not
exercise a right to revolution, because they are not a revolutionary
people. All they could do is kill each other. It is terrifying to have to
trust ordinary politics, to have to give up the ultimate sanction of
armed revolt, but America has already reached that point.
In the end, individuals may always maintain a moral right to de-
fend themselves against unjust government, regardless of circum-
stances. If the conspiracy theories were true, citizens might all need
to beg, borrow, or steal a gun -and take to the hills, fighting a guerrilla
war for their liberties-and they would be right to do so. In America,
it is easy to forget what people in the former Yugoslavia cannot forget:
only force wins. And therefore, if the revolution comes, and if the
nation collapses in virulent internecine warfare, perhaps everyone
would have a right to take up arms in defense of the family, the home,
or themselves. That right of self-defense could not be a constitutional
right, however, because it would occur outside of all constituted au-
thority, in the war of all against all. In such a time, it is difficult even
to speak of justice and injustice; one simply does what one has to do.
The Second Amendment' does not contemplate arming citizens in
preparation for such a time; it contemplates arming-the populace in
preparation for revolution made by an orderly and unified people ac-
cording to commonly shared norms and understandings. And that
sort of arming is no longer available.
As a result, America must hope that it never comes to the pass of
revolution. To forestall that pass, Americans can rely only on ordinary
politics. Citizens must struggle to create together a healthy and viable
democracy, unified enough to prevent fatal fissures in the body politic
but pluralist enough to celebrate different cultures and individuals.
Unfortunately, the theoretical world of the revolutionary Second
Amendment actively frustrates the creation of such a politics. In that
world, citizens must always be suspicious, seeing disagreement as the
product, not of good faith, but of deceit. In that world, citizens must
always be ready to take up arms and abandon political means of recon-
ciliation. And as a result, in that world, citizens must see the political
landscape as populated by the People and potential Others, not by
multiple, co-equal parties with different views but equal rights and
legitimacy.
For that reason, paradoxically, the militia's conception of the Sec-
ond Amendment poisons not only ordinary politics but revolutionary
politics as well. For a revolution to occur, the people must be even
more united than in a healthy democracy. Completely outside of the
normal political structures, they must rise as one to smite the tyrant.
If the American citizenry were already a People, the Amendment
might protect the right to revolution. But when a people, as now,
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does not exist, the suspicion, hostility, and violence implicit in the mi-
litia movement's theory of the amendment would make it almost im-
possible to create one. Ironically, then, the movement's particular
rendition of the revolutionary Second Amendment would actually en-
sure that a legitimate, constitutionally sanctioned Second Amendment
revolution could never occur.
In short, the Second Amendment right to revolution presupposes
a particular factual scenario. The People are profoundly unified with
a particular and consensual notion of their own good. A small band
of evildoers captures the government, departs from the general will,
and uses its power for its own nefarious purposes. The People then
make a revolution. Under these circumstances, the right to revolution
makes sense. The right does not make sense when the people them-
selves are profoundly divided about the common good, when the
problem is not a straying government but fissures within the citizenry
itself. Under today's circumstances, the right to revolution loses its
grounding, and citizens must look elsewhere for safety. Different his-
torical circumstances call for different forms of collective action.
With the loss of the right to revolution, however, come compen-
sating gains. Unlike the patriots of 1776, America now has a represen-
tative government and a written constitution.3 23 Throughout
America's history, groups of citizens have resisted the government in
the name of an abstraction called the People. On inspection, how-
ever, that abstraction always turns out to be a subset of the citizenry,
united by class, language, or political viewpoint; America is now a na-
tion of groups, not one unified people.3 24 The compensation is that
we no longer enjoy peoplehood precisely because we now have the
right to be different from each other. Because we will not suffer the
cultural orthodoxy necessary for unity, we have lost one great guaran-
tor of freedom, the right to revolution, but we have gained the day-to-
day freedom of a pluralist society. It remains to be seen whether such
a society can survive, but it has no hope so long as we are prepared to
kill each other in the name of a constitutional anachronism: the
People.
323 See Reynolds, supra note 164, at 464-71.
324 For example, Paul Gilje has carefully examined popular disorder in New York City
from 1763 to 1834. He argues that such disorder came to be seen as less legitimate for two
reasons. First, after the American Revolution, New York had a representative government.
Second, New Yorkers came to see popular disorder less as a protest of the People and more
as the opportunistic action of particular ethnic, religious, and class groups. PAUL A. GnJE,
THE ROAD TO MOBOCRACY. PoPuLAR DISORDER IN NEw YORK CITy, 1763-1834 (1987).
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